CERT-Polska/drakvuf-sandbox

Readiness score

How this is calculated · previous scan 99

Cryptographic posture

Quantum-vulnerable 2 Reduced margin 2 Could not be determined 1 Quantum-safe 4

To address	2
Key establishment	0
Inventory only	0
Total findings	9

What was analysed

Branch	`master`
Commit	`7c328ab48bfe07b99c896c8695b7e51edf431ceb` Bump version: v0.21.0 (#1220)
Committed	2026-08-19 15:36 UTC
Scanned	2026-09-10 22:12 UTC 4 hours ago
Coverage	139 files, 89 python, 29 javascript

Earlier scans of this repository

10 scans · score 100 → 96 · compare any two

10 scans · 100 → 96 (down 4). The filled point is the scan you are reading.

Scanned	Commit	Score	To address
4 hours ago this scan	`7c328ab48bfe` master	96	2
5 hours ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	99	1	Compare
21 hours ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
1 day ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
1 day ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
1 day ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
1 day ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
3 days ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
3 days ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare
8 days ago	`7c328ab48bfe` master	100	0	Compare

Every repository in this history is re-scanned weekly.

List of cryptographic assets

RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

SSH algorithms pinned in configuration

A `KexAlgorithms`, `HostKeyAlgorithms` or `Ciphers` directive in an SSH configuration. `KexAlgorithms` is the line that decides whether recorded sessions stay confidential.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. Put `sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com` first in `KexAlgorithms`. It is a hybrid, so it is no weaker than the classical exchange it replaces.

test/vm-runner-client/vm_runner_client/client.py:133 test path ssh_pub_key = "ssh-rsa " + vm_ssh_key.get_base64()

config.ssh-algorithms · CWE-757

SHA-256 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`hashlib.sha256()` and friends. The digest is read from the call, so SHA-384 and above are inventory while the broken ones are reported separately.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

drakrun/analyzer/analysis_metadata.py:19 sample_sha256 = hashlib.sha256()

py.hashlib

unknown Could not be determined Renamed import 1 place See details

SSH key handled by paramiko

`paramiko.RSAKey`, `ECDSAKey` or `Ed25519Key`. SSH host and user keys are long-lived, which makes them a slow and awkward thing to rotate later.

The algorithm could not be established from the source. Usually it is selected while the program runs, but it may equally be that the call gives no clue, or that it is decided somewhere this scan does not reach. Somebody has to check.

What to do. No post-quantum SSH signature is standardised yet. OpenSSH already supports the `sntrup761x25519` hybrid key exchange, which addresses the recorded-traffic half.

test/vm-runner-client/vm_runner_client/client.py:132 test path vm_ssh_key = RSAKey.generate(bits=2048)

py.paramiko.key · CWE-327

CSPRNG Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Random number generation

`secrets.token_bytes()`, `os.urandom()` or `ssl.RAND_bytes()`. Recorded so the inventory names its randomness source.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action. `random.random()` is a separate, present-day defect if it reaches key material.

drakrun/analyzer/postprocessing/plugins/karton_integration.py:97 token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
drakrun/cli/install.py:86 vnc_passwd = "".join(secrets.choice(passwd_characters) for _ in range(8))

py.rng

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm	Assessment	What it means	Occurrences
`CSPRNG`	Quantum-safe	A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer.	4
`SHA-256`	Reduced margin	Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.	2
`Ed25519`	Quantum-vulnerable	Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.	1
`unknown`	Could not be determined	The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach.	1
`RSASSA-PKCS1v15`	Quantum-vulnerable	Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.	1

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library	Files
paramiko an SSH client and server	1
hashlib the standard digests, including the broken ones	1
secrets the platform random source	2