wultra/powerauth-crypto

SHA-1 Already broken 1 place See details

Classical public-key cipher through the JCA

`Cipher.getInstance()` with a transformation whose algorithm component is a public-key or legacy symmetric cipher. The transformation string is parsed into algorithm, mode and padding, so `RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding` is separated from `RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding`.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures.

What to do. For RSA encryption, move to ML-KEM-768 and keep RSA-OAEP only as the classical half of a hybrid during transition.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:268 SecretKeyFactory skf = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.cipher · CWE-327

ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable 8 places See details

Elliptic-curve cryptography through BouncyCastle

A BouncyCastle elliptic-curve class. `ECDHBasicAgreement` in particular is key establishment and carries harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-DSA-65 for signatures, ML-KEM-768 for key establishment.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:22 import org.bouncycastle.jce.ECNamedCurveTable;
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:58 ECNamedCurveParameterSpec ecSpec = ECNamedCurveTable.getParameterSpec("secp256r1");
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:81 ECNamedCurveParameterSpec ecSpec = ECNamedCurveTable.getParameterSpec("secp256r1");
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:123 final ECNamedCurveParameterSpec ecSpec = ECNamedCurveTable.getParameterSpec("secp256r1");
5. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/ec/InvalidPointTest.java:23 test path import org.bouncycastle.jce.ECNamedCurveTable;
6. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/ec/InvalidPointTest.java:60 test path ECNamedCurveParameterSpec ecSpec = ECNamedCurveTable.getParameterSpec("secp256r1");
7. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConversionUtilsTest.java:22 test path import org.bouncycastle.jce.ECNamedCurveTable;
8. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConversionUtilsTest.java:95 test path ECParameterSpec ecSpec = ECNamedCurveTable.getParameterSpec("secp256r1");

java.bouncycastle.ec · CWE-327

ECDH256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 4 places See details

Named elliptic curve requested

`ECGenParameterSpec` names a curve explicitly. Every standardised prime curve is broken by Shor regardless of its size, so a larger curve is not a mitigation.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-DSA-65 for signatures, ML-KEM-768 for key establishment.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:69 kpg.initialize(new ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"));
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:93 parameters.init(new ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"));
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:132 parameters.init(new ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"));
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:168 parameters.init(new ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"));

java.eccurve · CWE-327

ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 4 places See details

Classical key material handled through the JCA

`KeyFactory.getInstance()` for a classical algorithm. This indicates the code parses or produces keys of that family, which is a migration surface even where it does no cryptography itself.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. Include this code path in the inventory: it has to accept post-quantum key encodings before the keys themselves can change.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:96 return KeyFactory.getInstance("EC", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME).generatePublic(ecPublicKeySpec);
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:136 return KeyFactory.getInstance("EC", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME).generatePublic(ecPublicKeySpec);
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:172 return KeyFactory.getInstance("EC", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME).generatePrivate(ecPrivateKeySpec);
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConversionUtilsTest.java:93 test path KeyFactory kf = KeyFactory.getInstance("ECDH", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.keyfactory · CWE-327

ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

Classical signature algorithm through the JCA

`Signature.getInstance()` with a classical algorithm. The digest and the key algorithm are split out of the JCA name, so `SHA1withRSA` reports both the broken digest and the quantum-vulnerable key.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204). Where the verifier cannot be changed, sign twice and publish both signatures.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:56 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:84 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:112 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.signature · CWE-327

ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Classical key pair generated through the JCA

`KeyPairGenerator.getInstance()` with a classical algorithm. The concrete family and, where an `initialize()` call is close enough to read, the key size are resolved from the source and reported on the finding.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. Generate the classical key alongside an ML-KEM or ML-DSA key and carry both until relying parties accept the post-quantum one.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:68 KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("ECDH", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.keypairgenerator · CWE-327

ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Classical key agreement through the JCA

`KeyAgreement.getInstance()` with ECDH, DH or XDH. Key agreement is the highest-priority class of finding: traffic recorded today is decrypted once the key exchange is broken.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203), or a hybrid X25519+ML-KEM-768 construction that keeps the classical guarantee while adding the quantum one.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:90 KeyAgreement keyAgreement = KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.keyagreement · CWE-327

SHA-256 Reduced margin 7 places See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/ECPublicKeyFingerprint.java:86 MessageDigest digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/HMACHashUtilities.java:51 Mac hmacSha256 = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/HMACHashUtilities.java:74 Mac hmacSha256 = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/Hash.java:47 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
5. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:56 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
6. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:84 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
7. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/SignatureUtils.java:112 final Signature ecdsa = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withECDSA", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.messagedigest · CWE-328

AES Reduced margin 6 places See details

Cipher transformation named away from the call

A JCA transformation string - `algorithm/mode/padding` - written somewhere other than a `getInstance()` argument, which is how a codebase that centralises its cryptography passes the choice to a helper. The string is unambiguous wherever it appears: nothing but a transformation is spelled that way.

This names an encryption method as text, and passes it to code elsewhere that does the work. It is the same choice, made in a different place.

What to do. The same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Move the constant and the call together, so the inventory keeps naming the algorithm after the change.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/client/activation/PowerAuthClientActivation.java:163 byte[] statusBlob = aes.decrypt(cStatusBlob, iv, transportKey, "AES/CBC/NoPadding");
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/AESEncryptionUtils.java:82 return this.encrypt(bytes, iv, secret, "AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding");
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/AESEncryptionUtils.java:125 return this.decrypt(bytes, iv, secret, "AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding");
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/server/activation/PowerAuthServerActivation.java:178 return new AESEncryptionUtils().encrypt(statusBlob, iv, transportKey, "AES/CBC/NoPadding");
5. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/activation/ActivationStatusBlobInfoTest.java:81 test path byte[] statusBlob = aes.decrypt(encryptedStatusBlob, zeroIv, transportKey, "AES/CBC/NoPadding");
6. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/activation/ActivationStatusBlobInfoTest.java:132 test path byte[] statusBlob = aes.decrypt(encryptedStatusBlob, zeroIv, transportKey, "AES/CBC/NoPadding");

java.transformation · CWE-327

AES Reduced margin 2 places See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:270 return new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/KeyConvertor.java:198 return new SecretKeySpec(bytesSecretKey, "AES");

java.keyspec · CWE-327

PBKDF2 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:267 PBEKeySpec spec = new PBEKeySpec(password.toCharArray(), salt, iterations, 128);

java.keyspec · CWE-327

PBKDF2 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A `SecretKeyFactory` for PBKDF2, or a BouncyCastle password KDF. Not a quantum exposure, and part of a complete inventory.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count. Argon2 through BouncyCastle is stronger.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:268 SecretKeyFactory skf = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.kdf

unknown Could not be determined 15 places See details

Non-cryptographic randomness near key material

`new Random()` or `Math.random()` in a file that also imports `java.security`, `javax.crypto` or BouncyCastle. `java.util.Random` is a linear congruential generator and its output is predictable from a handful of samples. The import check is what keeps this from firing on every retry jitter and test fixture in the tree.

Part of this code uses a predictable source of random numbers. If any key comes from it, that key can be guessed today, with no quantum computer needed.

What to do. `java.security.SecureRandom`. This is a classical defect, not a quantum one, and it is worth fixing first.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:253 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:275 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
3. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:297 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
4. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:371 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
5. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:393 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
6. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:415 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
7. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:478 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
8. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/GenerateVectorDataTest.java:501 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * dataMax));
9. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:121 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
10. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:160 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
11. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:256 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
12. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:295 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
13. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:390 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
14. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:429 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));
15. powerauth-java-crypto/src/test/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/signature/PowerAuthSignatureTest.java:473 test path byte[] data = keyGenerator.generateRandomBytes((int) (Math.random() * 1000));

java.random.insecure · CWE-338

unknown Could not be determined 2 places See details

Key pair algorithm chosen at runtime

`KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(x)` where the argument is an identifier. The algorithm cannot be resolved without running the program, so this is reported as an unknown rather than assumed to be classical.

This code picks its encryption method while it runs, so a scan cannot tell which one it ends up using. Somebody has to check the configuration.

What to do. Trace the value to its configuration source and record the concrete algorithm in the cryptographic inventory by hand.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/AESEncryptionUtils.java:57 Cipher cipherForCryptoResponse = Cipher.getInstance(transformation, PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/AESEncryptionUtils.java:100 Cipher cipherForCryptoResponse = Cipher.getInstance(transformation, PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.keypairgenerator.variable · CWE-327

unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/totp/Totp.java:285 final SecretKeySpec macKey = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "RAW");

java.keyspec · CWE-327

unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Cryptographic library in the dependency manifest

A dependency known to implement classical asymmetric cryptography. Its presence is inventory, not a finding about this codebase: the library may never be called with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

The project depends on a cryptography library. Listed so the inventory is complete; it is not by itself a problem.

What to do. Check the version. Several of these libraries have shipped ML-KEM and ML-DSA support since 2024, so the migration may need an upgrade rather than a replacement.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/pom.xml:61 <artifactId>bcprov-jdk18on</artifactId>

dep.crypto-library

Argon2 Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A `SecretKeyFactory` for PBKDF2, or a BouncyCastle password KDF. Not a quantum exposure, and part of a complete inventory.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count. Argon2 through BouncyCastle is stronger.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/PasswordHash.java:22 import org.bouncycastle.crypto.generators.Argon2BytesGenerator;
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/PasswordHash.java:113 Argon2BytesGenerator gen = new Argon2BytesGenerator();

java.kdf

HMAC Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Message authentication code through the JCA

`Mac.getInstance()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor and is only marginally affected by Grover; it is inventoried, not flagged, unless the underlying digest is broken.

This is a fingerprint used to prove a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action beyond avoiding HmacMD5 and HmacSHA1.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/HMACHashUtilities.java:51 Mac hmacSha256 = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);
2. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/HMACHashUtilities.java:74 Mac hmacSha256 = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256", PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.mac

CSPRNG Quantum-safe From a constant 1 place See details

Random number generation

`SecureRandom`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `SHA1PRNG` is named explicitly where it appears, since it is a legacy algorithm even though its output is adequate.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action. Prefer the platform default over naming an algorithm.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/generator/KeyGenerator.java:153 random = SecureRandom.getInstance(SECURE_RANDOM_ALGORITHM_NAME, PowerAuthConfiguration.CRYPTO_PROVIDER_NAME);

java.rng

HMAC Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

1. powerauth-java-crypto/src/main/java/io/getlime/security/powerauth/crypto/lib/util/HMACHashUtilities.java:52 SecretKey hmacKey = new SecretKeySpec(key, "HmacSHA256");

java.keyspec · CWE-327