Crypto-View

apache/httpcomponents-client

Cryptographic posture

234 cryptographic locations: 66 already broken, 51 quantum-vulnerable, 39 reduced-margin, 47 undetermined, 31 quantum-safe

26 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 680 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 51 Already broken 66 Reduced margin 39 Could not be determined 47 Quantum-safe 31
To address141
Key establishment26
Inventory only0
Total findings234
What was analysed
Branch master
Commit e6cc9767dcebd26caa23e24f20424e19fa07ef51 Moved socket timeout integration tests to 'time-out' to be executed manually during release preparation due to those tests failing intermittently in CI
Committed 2026-10-22 14:05 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-22 16:07 UTC 28 days ago
Coverage 680 files, 656 java
545 test files not scanned

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 100 locations Already broken 38 → 66 (up 28) Quantum-vulnerable 47 → 51 (up 4) Reduced margin 12 → 38 (up 26) Could not be determined 48 → 44 (down 4) Quantum-safe 4 → 31 (up 27) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago ccc239131391 master 137 26 Compare
28 days ago this scan e6cc9767dceb master 141 26
28 days ago 1d0ae9b6795a master 117 26 Compare
29 days ago ffe4a05f4faf 64 6 Compare

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

DES Already broken 11 places See details

Classical public-key cipher through the JCA

`Cipher.getInstance()` with a transformation whose algorithm component is a public-key or legacy symmetric cipher. The transformation string is parsed into algorithm, mode and padding, so `RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding` is separated from `RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding`.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. A 56-bit key is brute-forced classically in hours.

What to do. For RSA encryption, move to ML-KEM-768 and keep RSA-OAEP only as the classical half of a hybrid during transition.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:576 Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding");
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:578 final byte[] lowPart = des.doFinal(truncatedResponse);
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:579 des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding");
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:581 final byte[] highPart = des.doFinal(truncatedResponse);
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:661 final Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding");
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:663 final byte[] lowHash = des.doFinal(magicConstant);
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:665 final byte[] highHash = des.doFinal(magicConstant);
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:741 final Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding");
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:743 final byte[] lowResponse = des.doFinal(challenge);
  10. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:745 final byte[] middleResponse = des.doFinal(challenge);
  11. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:747 final byte[] highResponse = des.doFinal(challenge);
java.cipher · CWE-327
MD5 Already broken 11 places See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

java.messagedigest · CWE-328
DES Already broken 7 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

code.named-call
MD5 Already broken 6 places See details

HTTP Digest authentication

An HTTP Digest authentication implementation. RFC 7616 Digest is built on MD5 in its widely deployed form. This is not a quantum question: it is weak today and depends entirely on the TLS underneath it. HTTP Basic is deliberately not matched - it is base64 and contains no cryptography to inventory.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest.

What to do. Move to a token-based scheme. Where Digest must remain, use the SHA-256 variant.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/async/H2AsyncClientBuilder.java:975 .register(StandardAuthScheme.DIGEST, DigestSchemeFactory.INSTANCE)
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/async/HttpAsyncClientBuilder.java:1264 .register(StandardAuthScheme.DIGEST, DigestSchemeFactory.INSTANCE)
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestSchemeFactory.java:46 public class DigestSchemeFactory implements AuthSchemeFactory {
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:90 public class DigestScheme implements AuthScheme, Serializable {
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/classic/HttpClientBuilder.java:1081 .register(StandardAuthScheme.DIGEST, DigestSchemeFactory.INSTANCE)
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/classic/ProxyClient.java:117 .register(StandardAuthScheme.DIGEST, DigestSchemeFactory.INSTANCE)
java.httpauth · CWE-328
MD5 Already broken 6 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

code.named-call
NTLM Already broken 6 places See details

NTLM authentication

An NTLM implementation. NTLM derives its credentials from MD4 and is broken by relay and offline cracking today; Microsoft has been deprecating it since 2024.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. NTLM authenticates with MD4-derived hashes and is broken by relay and cracking attacks today. Quantum computing is beside the point.

What to do. Kerberos, or a modern token-based scheme. This is a present-day defect, not a future one.

  1. httpclient5-fluent/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/fluent/Executor.java:254 return auth(host, new org.apache.hc.client5.http.auth.NTCredentials(username, password, workstation, domain));
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/auth/NTCredentials.java:55 public class NTCredentials implements Credentials, Serializable {
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:55 final class NTLMEngineImpl implements NTLMEngine {
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngine.java:39 public interface NTLMEngine {
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMSchemeFactory.java:59 return new NTLMScheme();
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMScheme.java:60 public final class NTLMScheme implements AuthScheme {
java.ntlm · CWE-327
MD4 Already broken 4 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

code.named-call
SHA-1 Already broken 4 places See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

java.messagedigest · CWE-328
RC4 Already broken 3 places See details

Classical public-key cipher through the JCA

`Cipher.getInstance()` with a transformation whose algorithm component is a public-key or legacy symmetric cipher. The transformation string is parsed into algorithm, mode and padding, so `RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding` is separated from `RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-256AndMGF1Padding`.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. RC4 keystream biases break it classically; it is prohibited in TLS by RFC 7465.

What to do. For RSA encryption, move to ML-KEM-768 and keep RSA-OAEP only as the classical half of a hybrid during transition.

java.cipher · CWE-327
RC4 Already broken 3 places See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:605 rc4.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec(key, "RC4"));
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:847 cipher.init( Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec( sealingKey, "RC4" ) );
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:851 cipher.init( Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec( sealingKey, "RC4" ) );
java.keyspec · CWE-327
RC4 Already broken 3 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

code.named-call
DES Already broken 1 place See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

java.keyspec · CWE-327
MD4 Already broken 1 place See details

Algorithm implemented in the repository

A class named for the algorithm it is, rather than one that calls a library: NTLM's `class MD4`, a bundled `class Sha256`, `class SCrypt`, `class Ed25519Java`. Cryptography the project carries itself is cryptography nobody else patches.

This project carries its own copy of an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Prefer the platform's or a maintained library's implementation, and record why this one exists if it has to stay.

code.implementation
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 26 places See details

TLS used in code

A TLS connection, context or setting made in code: `SSLContexts.createDefault()`, `SSLSocketFactory.getDefault()`, `setEnabledProtocols()`, `setEnabledCipherSuites()`, `startHandshake()`, Go `tls.VersionTLS12` and `tls.Dial()`, Python `ssl.create_default_context()`, Node `tls.connect()`, and version names such as `"TLSv1.2"`. Every TLS key exchange in general use is classical, so recorded traffic is exposed.

This code opens or configures an encrypted connection. Its key exchange is the part a future quantum computer breaks, which exposes traffic recorded today.

What to do. TLS 1.3 everywhere, then a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 as the platform offers it.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/nio/DefaultManagedAsyncClientConnection.java:169 ((TransportSecurityLayer) ioSession).startTls(sslContext, endpoint, sslBufferMode, initializer, verifier,
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:128 tlsSession.startTls(sslContext, endpoint, sslBufferManagement, (e, sslEngine) -> {
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:136 sslParameters.setProtocols(supportedProtocols);
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:138 sslParameters.setProtocols(this.supportedProtocols);
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:140 sslParameters.setProtocols(TLS.excludeWeak(sslParameters.getProtocols()));
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:144 sslParameters.setCipherSuites(supportedCipherSuites);
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:146 sslParameters.setCipherSuites(this.supportedCipherSuites);
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:148 sslParameters.setCipherSuites(TlsCiphers.excludeH2Blacklisted(sslParameters.getCipherSuites()));
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:225 sslParameters.setProtocols(supportedProtocols);
  10. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:227 sslParameters.setProtocols(TLS.excludeWeak(upgradedSocket.getEnabledProtocols()));
  11. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:230 sslParameters.setCipherSuites(supportedCipherSuites);
  12. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:232 sslParameters.setCipherSuites(TlsCiphers.excludeWeak(upgradedSocket.getEnabledCipherSuites()));
  13. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/AbstractClientTlsStrategy.java:245 upgradedSocket.startHandshake();
  14. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/ClientTlsStrategyBuilder.java:186 final SSLContext sslContextCopy = sslContext != null ? sslContext : SSLContexts.createDefault();
  15. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/ConscryptClientTlsStrategy.java:56 SSLContexts.createDefault(),
  16. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/DefaultClientTlsStrategy.java:56 SSLContexts.createDefault(),
  17. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/HttpsSupport.java:54 return split(System.getProperty("https.protocols"));
  18. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/HttpsSupport.java:62 return split(System.getProperty("https.cipherSuites"));
  19. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactoryBuilder.java:119 socketFactory = SSLContexts.createDefault().getSocketFactory();
  20. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:101 return new SSLConnectionSocketFactory(SSLContexts.createDefault(), HttpsSupport.getDefaultHostnameVerifier());
  21. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:308 sslsock.setEnabledProtocols(supportedProtocols);
  22. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:310 sslsock.setEnabledProtocols(TLS.excludeWeak(sslsock.getEnabledProtocols()));
  23. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:313 sslsock.setEnabledCipherSuites(supportedCipherSuites);
  24. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:315 sslsock.setEnabledCipherSuites(TlsCiphers.excludeWeak(sslsock.getEnabledCipherSuites()));
  25. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:329 sslsock.startHandshake();
  26. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SSLConnectionSocketFactory.java:348 sslsock.startHandshake();
tls.protocol · CWE-757
SHA-256 Reduced margin 13 places See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

  1. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/CacheKeyGenerator.java:195 digester = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  2. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/CacheKeyGenerator.java:204 return Hex.encodeHexString(digester.digest());
  3. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/FileResourceFactory.java:67 sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  4. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/FileResourceFactory.java:72 buf.append(TextUtils.toHexString(sha256.digest()));
  5. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/SHA256KeyHashingScheme.java:58 return Hex.encodeHexString(md.digest());
  6. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/SHA256KeyHashingScheme.java:63 return MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:683 case "SHA-256":
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:834 case "SHA-256":
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:1775 final MessageDigest sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance( "SHA-256" );
  10. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:1776 final byte[] certHashBytes = sha256.digest( certBytes );
  11. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/ScramScheme.java:728 return MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(in);
  12. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SpkiPinningClientTlsStrategy.java:303 final MessageDigest sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  13. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SpkiPinningClientTlsStrategy.java:309 out.add(sha256.digest(spki));
java.messagedigest · CWE-328
Kerberos Reduced margin 9 places See details

Kerberos or SPNEGO authentication

`javax.security.auth.kerberos` or a GSS-API call. Kerberos itself is symmetric and survives Shor; its PKINIT certificate flow is public-key and does not. The encryption types configured for the realm decide whether it is also a present-day concern.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Kerberos is symmetric at its core, so Shor does not break it. The surrounding PKINIT certificate flow is public-key and does fall.

What to do. Restrict the realm to AES encryption types, and treat PKINIT certificates as part of the public-key migration.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/GGSSchemeBase.java:129 protected GSSManager getManager() {
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/GGSSchemeBase.java:141 final GSSContext gssContext = createGSSContext(manager, oid, serverName, gssCredential);
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/GGSSchemeBase.java:143 return gssContext.initSecContext(input, 0, input.length);
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/GGSSchemeBase.java:145 return gssContext.initSecContext(new byte[] {}, 0, 0);
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/GGSSchemeBase.java:156 final GSSContext gssContext = manager.createContext(serverName.canonicalize(oid), oid, gssCredential,
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/KerberosSchemeFactory.java:79 return new KerberosScheme(this.config, this.dnsResolver);
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/KerberosScheme.java:52 public class KerberosScheme extends GGSSchemeBase {
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/SPNegoSchemeFactory.java:79 return new SPNegoScheme(this.config, this.dnsResolver);
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/SPNegoScheme.java:53 public class SPNegoScheme extends GGSSchemeBase {
java.kerberos
SHA-256 Reduced margin 6 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/MemcachedHttpAsyncCacheStorage.java:115 this(cache, CacheConfig.DEFAULT, HttpByteArrayCacheEntrySerializer.INSTANCE, SHA256KeyHashingScheme.INSTANCE);
  2. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/MemcachedHttpCacheStorage.java:113 this(cache, CacheConfig.DEFAULT, HttpByteArrayCacheEntrySerializer.INSTANCE, SHA256KeyHashingScheme.INSTANCE);
  3. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/MemcachedHttpCacheStorage.java:125 this(cache, CacheConfig.DEFAULT, HttpByteArrayCacheEntrySerializer.INSTANCE, SHA256KeyHashingScheme.INSTANCE, null);
  4. httpclient5-cache/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/cache/memcached/SHA256KeyHashingScheme.java:50 public static final SHA256KeyHashingScheme INSTANCE = new SHA256KeyHashingScheme();
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/ScramScheme.java:560 storedKey = sha256(clientKey);
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/SpkiPinningClientTlsStrategy.java:201 final byte[][] peerSpkiHashes = chainSpkiSha256(sslSession);
code.named-call
Kerberos Reduced margin 2 places See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/KerberosScheme.java:54 private static final String KERBEROS_OID = "1.2.840.113554.1.2.2";
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/KerberosScheme.java:74 return generateGSSToken(input, new Oid(KERBEROS_OID), serviceName, authServer);
code.oid
SPNEGO Reduced margin 2 places See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/SPNegoScheme.java:55 private static final String SPNEGO_OID = "1.3.6.1.5.5.2";
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/SPNegoScheme.java:75 return generateGSSToken(input, new Oid(SPNEGO_OID), serviceName, authServer);
code.oid
PBKDF2 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/ScramScheme.java:558 salted = hiPBKDF2(this.password, this.salt, this.iterations, 32);
code.named-call
PBKDF2 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/ScramScheme.java:717 final PBEKeySpec spec = new PBEKeySpec(password, salt, iterations, dkLen * 8);
java.keyspec · CWE-327
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A `SecretKeyFactory` for PBKDF2, or a BouncyCastle password KDF. Not a quantum exposure, and part of a complete inventory.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count. Argon2 through BouncyCastle is stronger.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/ScramScheme.java:718 return SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA256").generateSecret(spec).getEncoded();
java.kdf
unknown Could not be determined 9 places See details

Algorithm chosen at runtime

`KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(x)`, `Mac.getInstance(lookup(key))` and the other JCA factories, where the argument is a variable or a call. The algorithm cannot be resolved without running the program, so this is reported as an unknown rather than assumed to be classical; what the factory does - sign, tag, digest - is still reported, and so are the lines that use the object.

This code picks its encryption method while it runs, so a scan cannot tell which one it ends up using. Somebody has to check the configuration.

What to do. Trace the value to its configuration source and record the concrete algorithm in the cryptographic inventory by hand.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:305 final String hasha1 = formatHex(digester.digest(a1));
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:315 final String hasha2 = formatHex(digester.digest(a2rsp));
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:319 final String expected = formatHex(digester.digest(kd.getBytes(charset)));
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:396 return MessageDigest.getInstance(digAlg);
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:494 final byte[] hashedBytes = digester.digest(usernameRealm.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:511 final String checksum = formatHex(digester.digest(this.buffer.toByteArray()));
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:520 final String hasha1 = formatHex(digester.digest(a1));
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:555 final String hasha2 = formatHex(digester.digest(a2));
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/DigestScheme.java:571 final String digest = formatHex(digester.digest(digestInput));
java.keypairgenerator.variable · CWE-327
X.509 Could not be determined 6 places See details

Certificate verification disabled

TLS certificate or host-name verification switched off: `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, `verify=False`, `ssl.CERT_NONE`, `NoopHostnameVerifier`, `TrustAllStrategy`. Any key exchange is worthless when the peer is not authenticated, post-quantum or not.

This connection accepts any certificate, so it cannot tell the real server from an impostor.

What to do. Verify certificates. Pin a private CA through a trust store instead of switching verification off.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/NoopHostnameVerifier.java:43 public class NoopHostnameVerifier implements HostnameVerifier {
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/NoopHostnameVerifier.java:48 public static final NoopHostnameVerifier INSTANCE = new NoopHostnameVerifier();
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/TrustAllStrategy.java:51 public class TrustAllStrategy implements TrustStrategy {
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/TrustAllStrategy.java:56 public static final TrustAllStrategy INSTANCE = new TrustAllStrategy();
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/TrustSelfSignedStrategy.java:53 public class TrustSelfSignedStrategy implements TrustStrategy {
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/ssl/TrustSelfSignedStrategy.java:58 public static final TrustSelfSignedStrategy INSTANCE = new TrustSelfSignedStrategy();
x509.verification-disabled · CWE-295
HMAC-MD5 Quantum-safe 14 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:547 ntlmv2UserSessionKey = hmacMD5(truncatedResponse, ntlmv2hash);
  2. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:559 ntlm2SessionResponseUserSessionKey = hmacMD5(sessionNonce,getNTLMUserSessionKey());
  3. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:595 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5(key);
  4. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:597 return hmacMD5.getOutput();
  5. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:699 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5(ntlmHash);
  6. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:705 return hmacMD5.getOutput();
  7. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:715 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5(ntlmHash);
  8. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:721 return hmacMD5.getOutput();
  9. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:773 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5(hash);
  10. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:776 final byte[] mac = hmacMD5.getOutput();
  11. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:898 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5( signingKey );
  12. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:901 final byte[] hmac = hmacMD5.getOutput();
  13. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:1746 final HMACMD5 hmacMD5 = new HMACMD5( exportedSessionKey );
  14. httpclient5/src/main/java/org/apache/hc/client5/http/impl/auth/NTLMEngineImpl.java:1750 final byte[] mic = hmacMD5.getOutput();
code.named-call
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 9 places See details

Random number generation

`SecureRandom`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `SHA1PRNG` is named explicitly where it appears, since it is a legacy algorithm even though its output is adequate.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action. Prefer the platform default over naming an algorithm.

java.rng
HMAC Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

code.named-call
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 3 places See details

Message authentication code through the JCA

`Mac.getInstance()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor and is only marginally affected by Grover; it is inventoried, not flagged, unless the underlying digest is broken.

This is a fingerprint used to prove a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action beyond avoiding HmacMD5 and HmacSHA1.

java.mac
HMAC-MD5 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Algorithm implemented in the repository

A class named for the algorithm it is, rather than one that calls a library: NTLM's `class MD4`, a bundled `class Sha256`, `class SCrypt`, `class Ed25519Java`. Cryptography the project carries itself is cryptography nobody else patches.

This project carries its own copy of an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Prefer the platform's or a maintained library's implementation, and record why this one exists if it has to stay.

code.implementation

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls. 51
unknown Could not be determined The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach. 41
MD5 Already broken Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest. 23
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 22
DES Already broken A 56-bit key is brute-forced classically in hours. 19
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 19
Kerberos Reduced margin Kerberos is symmetric at its core, so Shor does not break it. The surrounding PKINIT certificate flow is public-key and does fall. 17
RC4 Already broken RC4 keystream biases break it classically; it is prohibited in TLS by RFC 7465. 9
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 9
NTLM Already broken NTLM authenticates with MD4-derived hashes and is broken by relay and cracking attacks today. Quantum computing is beside the point. 6
X.509 Could not be determined An X.509 certificate, signing request or revocation list, or a signature over one. The algorithm is the key's, which this code does not name. 6
MD4 Already broken MD4 collisions are trivial. It survives only inside NTLM, which is itself obsolete. 5
SHA-1 Already broken SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures. 4
PBKDF2 Reduced margin Not broken by a quantum computer, but weak against modern GPU cracking at low iteration counts, which is a present-day concern. 3

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
javax.net.ssl the TLS client and server 25
org.ietf.jgss GSS-API, usually Kerberos or SPNEGO 4
java.security the JCA 30