Crypto-View

panva/node-oidc-provider

Cryptographic posture

325 cryptographic locations: 146 quantum-vulnerable, 62 reduced-margin, 42 undetermined, 75 quantum-safe

47 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 1 imported cryptographic library is listed separately. 233 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 146 Reduced margin 62 Could not be determined 42 Quantum-safe 75
To address163
Key establishment47
Inventory only1
Total findings326
What was analysed
Branch main
Commit 14e76834f1a0f764bd392ed980ca80c9e5b788c6 build: keep DT sync tooling in provider
Committed 2026-10-23 08:45 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-23 11:20 UTC 27 days ago
Coverage 233 files, 206 javascript
228 test files not scanned

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 1000 locations Quantum-vulnerable 543 → 146 (down 397) Reduced margin 134 → 62 (down 72) Could not be determined 70 → 42 (down 28) Quantum-safe 306 → 75 (down 231) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago this scan 14e76834f1a0 main 163 47
28 days ago 8e13e7d05b59 main 156 47 Compare
28 days ago 8e13e7d05b59 main 123 30 Compare
29 days ago 78474ace5fb2 546 145 Compare

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

Ed25519255-bitother/Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable 21 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:90 crv: 'Ed25519',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:6 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3445 'Ed25519',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3446 'EdDSA',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3467 idTokenSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3492 'Ed25519',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3493 'EdDSA',
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3514 userinfoSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3538 'Ed25519',
  10. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3539 'EdDSA',
  11. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3564 'Ed25519',
  12. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3565 'EdDSA',
  13. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3832 dPoPSigningAlgValues: ['ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  14. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3851 attestSigningAlgValues: ['ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  15. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:74 case 'Ed25519':
  16. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:75 available = ['EdDSA', 'Ed25519'];
  17. lib/helpers/keystore.js:116 case 'EdDSA':
  18. lib/helpers/keystore.js:117 case 'Ed25519': return 'Ed25519';
  19. lib/models/client.js:28 const OKP_SUBTYPES = new Set(['Ed25519', 'X25519']);
  20. lib/models/id_token.js:29 case 'Ed25519':
  21. lib/models/id_token.js:30 case 'EdDSA': // alias for Ed25519, Ed448 is not supported
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PSS-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 15 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:27 const ALGS = ['PS256'];
  2. certification/fapi/index.js:307 authorization_signed_response_alg: 'PS256',
  3. certification/fapi/index.js:308 id_token_signed_response_alg: 'PS256',
  4. certification/fapi/index.js:309 request_object_signing_alg: 'PS256',
  5. certification/fapi/plan.json:24 "alg": "PS256",
  6. certification/fapi/plan.json:55 "alg": "PS256",
  7. lib/consts/jwa.js:4 'PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512',
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3443 'PS256',
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3467 idTokenSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  10. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3490 'PS256',
  11. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3514 userinfoSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  12. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3536 'PS256',
  13. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3562 'PS256',
  14. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  15. lib/models/id_token.js:16 case 'PS256':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 13 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:32 authorization_signed_response_alg: 'RS256',
  2. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:36 id_token_signed_response_alg: 'RS256',
  3. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:37 introspection_signed_response_alg: 'RS256',
  4. lib/consts/jwa.js:3 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:826 id_token_signed_response_alg: 'RS256',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3442 'RS256',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3467 idTokenSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3489 'RS256',
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3514 userinfoSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  10. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3535 'RS256',
  11. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3561 'RS256',
  12. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  13. lib/models/id_token.js:15 case 'RS256':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ECDSA-P256 Quantum-vulnerable 11 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:5 'ES256', 'ES384', 'ES512',
  2. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3444 'ES256',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3467 idTokenSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3491 'ES256',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3514 userinfoSigningAlgValues: ['RS256', 'PS256', 'ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3537 'ES256',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3563 'ES256',
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3832 dPoPSigningAlgValues: ['ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3851 attestSigningAlgValues: ['ES256', 'Ed25519', 'EdDSA'],
  10. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:61 available = ['ES256'];
  11. lib/models/id_token.js:17 case 'ES256':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ECDH-ES Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 8 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:19 'ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW',
  2. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3591 'ECDH-ES',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3620 'ECDH-ES',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3649 'ECDH-ES',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3679 'ECDH-ES',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3709 'ECDH-ES',
  7. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:119 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
  8. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:127 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSA-OAEP-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 7 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:18 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512',
  2. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3593 'RSA-OAEP-256',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3622 'RSA-OAEP-256',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3651 'RSA-OAEP-256',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3681 'RSA-OAEP-256',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3711 'RSA-OAEP-256',
  7. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:112 available = ['RSA-OAEP', 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 6 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
RSA-OAEP Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 6 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ECDH-P256256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 4 places See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:48 crv: 'P-256',
  2. certification/oidc/configuration.js:55 crv: 'P-256',
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:116 case 'P-256':
  4. lib/models/client.js:27 const EC_CURVES = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384', 'P-521']);
code.curve
ECDH-P384384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 4 places See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:62 crv: 'P-384',
  2. certification/oidc/configuration.js:69 crv: 'P-384',
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:117 case 'P-384':
  4. lib/models/client.js:27 const EC_CURVES = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384', 'P-521']);
code.curve
ECDH-P521521-bitsecg/secp521r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 4 places See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:76 crv: 'P-521',
  2. certification/oidc/configuration.js:83 crv: 'P-521',
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:118 case 'P-521':
  4. lib/models/client.js:27 const EC_CURVES = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384', 'P-521']);
code.curve
ECDSA-P256 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/helpers/validate_dpop.js:91 jwt = await jwtVerify(proof, EmbeddedJWK, { algorithms: dPoPSigningAlgValues, typ: 'dpop+jwt' });
  2. lib/shared/attest_client_auth.js:39 verifiedAttestation = await jose.jwtVerify(
  3. lib/shared/attest_client_auth.js:106 verifiedPoP = await jose.jwtVerify(
jws.operation
ECDSA-P384 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:5 'ES256', 'ES384', 'ES512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:64 available = ['ES384'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:22 case 'ES384':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ECDSA-P521 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:5 'ES256', 'ES384', 'ES512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:67 available = ['ES512'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:27 case 'ES512':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
Ed25519255-bitother/Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
Ed25519255-bitother/Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/helpers/validate_dpop.js:91 jwt = await jwtVerify(proof, EmbeddedJWK, { algorithms: dPoPSigningAlgValues, typ: 'dpop+jwt' });
  2. lib/shared/attest_client_auth.js:39 verifiedAttestation = await jose.jwtVerify(
  3. lib/shared/attest_client_auth.js:106 verifiedPoP = await jose.jwtVerify(
jws.operation
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA384 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:3 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:20 case 'RS384':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA512 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:3 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:25 case 'RS512':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PSS-SHA384 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:4 'PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:21 case 'PS384':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PSS-SHA512 Quantum-vulnerable 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:4 'PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:56 available = ['PS256', 'PS384', 'PS512', 'RS256', 'RS384', 'RS512'];
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:26 case 'PS512':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ECDSA256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable 2 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
ECDSA384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable 2 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
ECDSA521-bitsecg/secp521r1 Quantum-vulnerable 2 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
RSA-OAEP-SHA384 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 2 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:18 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:112 available = ['RSA-OAEP', 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
RSA-OAEP-SHA512 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 2 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:18 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512',
  2. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:112 available = ['RSA-OAEP', 'RSA-OAEP-256', 'RSA-OAEP-384', 'RSA-OAEP-512'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 2 places See details

TLS used in code

A TLS connection, context or setting made in code: `SSLContexts.createDefault()`, `SSLSocketFactory.getDefault()`, `setEnabledProtocols()`, `setEnabledCipherSuites()`, `startHandshake()`, Go `tls.VersionTLS12` and `tls.Dial()`, Python `ssl.create_default_context()`, Node `tls.connect()`, and version names such as `"TLSv1.2"`. Every TLS key exchange in general use is classical, so recorded traffic is exposed.

This code opens or configures an encrypted connection. Its key exchange is the part a future quantum computer breaks, which exposes traffic recorded today.

What to do. TLS 1.3 everywhere, then a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 as the platform offers it.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:541 const server = https.createServer({
  2. certification/oidc/docker.js:46 const server = https.createServer({
tls.protocol · CWE-757
EC Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

  1. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:20 crv: jwk.crv, kty: 'EC', x: jwk.x, y: jwk.y,
jose.jwk · CWE-327
ECDSA-P256256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

code.curve
ECDSA-P384384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

code.curve
ECDSA-P521521-bitsecg/secp521r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

code.curve
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
RSASSA-PSS-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. .github/workflows/conformance.yml:217 NODE_OPTIONS: --tls-cipher-list="ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
X25519255-bitother/Curve25519 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

jose.jwk · CWE-327
SHA-256 Reduced margin 4 places See details

Algorithm named in a setting

A setting whose name says it holds an algorithm, given a literal that names one: `withOaepPaddingDigestAlgorithm("SHA-512")`, `signatureAlgorithm = "SHA256withRSA"`, `"digestAlgorithm": "SHA-256"`. The algorithm never reaches a `getInstance()` in this file - it is carried to one somewhere else, often through configuration - so a scan that only reads the factories cannot see it at all.

Something here is configured to use a named algorithm. The code that uses it may be somewhere else entirely, but this is the line that decides which algorithm it is.

What to do. Find what consumes the setting. The migration belongs to that operation; this line is where the choice is actually written down, and usually where it is easiest to change.

  1. lib/helpers/script_src_sha.js:13 const digest = crypto.hash('sha256', script, 'base64');
  2. lib/models/client.js:176 const digest = length <= 32 ? 'sha256' : length <= 48 ? 'sha384' : length <= 64 ? 'sha512' : false;
  3. lib/models/client.js:597 const propHash = crypto.hash('sha256', JSON.stringify(properties), 'base64url');
  4. tools/dt/update-types.mjs:197 const actualHash = createHash("sha256")
config.algorithm-setting · CWE-327
AES Reduced margin 3 places See details

Public key declared as a JSON Web Key

A `kty` field, with the curve read from the sibling `crv` where the family needs one. A JWKS document declares a key without naming an algorithm anywhere, so it is invisible to a scan that only looks for `alg`.

This file publishes the public keys other systems use to check this system's signatures. Everyone who trusts these keys has to accept the new kind of key before the old ones can be retired.

What to do. A published JWKS is what relying parties trust. It has to accept a post-quantum key type before the keys behind it can change, so put it early in the migration order.

  1. lib/models/client.js:357 alg, use: 'sig', kty: 'oct', k: base64url.encode(client.clientSecret),
  2. lib/models/client.js:362 alg, use: 'enc', kty: 'oct', k: deriveEncryptionKey(client.clientSecret, len).toString('base64url'),
  3. lib/models/client.js:367 alg, use: 'enc', kty: 'oct', k: deriveEncryptionKey(client.clientSecret, len).toString('base64url'),
jose.jwk · CWE-327
SHA-256 Reduced margin 20 places See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:191 return crypto.createHash('sha256')
  2. docs/type-contracts.js:609 return createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(payload)).digest('hex');
  3. lib/actions/credential.js:265 const proofThumbprint = await calculateJwkThumbprint(proofJwk);
  4. lib/actions/credential.js:269 .map((jwk) => calculateJwkThumbprint(jwk)),
  5. lib/helpers/certificate_thumbprint.js:14 return crypto.hash('sha256', data, 'base64url');
  6. lib/helpers/challenge.js:19 hkdfSync('sha256', secret, sixfourbeify(step), info, 32),
  7. lib/helpers/check_attest_binding.js:7 if (model.attestationJkt !== await jose.calculateJwkThumbprint(jwk)) {
  8. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:37 return crypto.hash('sha256', JSON.stringify(components), 'base64url');
  9. lib/helpers/pkce.js:18 expected = crypto.hash('sha256', expected, 'base64url');
  10. lib/helpers/script_src_sha.js:13 const digest = crypto.hash('sha256', script, 'base64');
  11. lib/helpers/validate_dpop.js:58 if (accessToken && jwt.payload.ath !== crypto.hash('sha256', accessToken, 'base64url')) {
  12. lib/helpers/validate_dpop.js:142 const ath = crypto.hash('sha256', accessToken, 'base64url');
  13. lib/helpers/validate_dpop.js:168 const thumbprint = await calculateJwkThumbprint(protectedHeader.jwk);
  14. lib/models/client.js:597 const propHash = crypto.hash('sha256', JSON.stringify(properties), 'base64url');
  15. lib/models/id_token.js:19 return 'sha256';
  16. lib/models/replay_detection.js:15 const id = crypto.hash('sha256', `${iss}${jti}`, 'base64url');
  17. lib/models/token_helpers.js:42 token.attestationJkt = await jose.calculateJwkThumbprint(jwk);
  18. lib/shared/attest_client_auth.js:97 thumbprint = await jose.calculateJwkThumbprint(verifiedAttestation.payload.cnf.jwk);
  19. tools/dt/update-types.mjs:197 const actualHash = createHash("sha256")
  20. tools/dt/update-types.mjs:291 return createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(outputs))).digest("hex");
js.hash · CWE-328
AES-128-CBC Reduced margin 11 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:130 authorization_encrypted_response_enc: ['authorization_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  2. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:131 id_token_encrypted_response_enc: ['id_token_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  3. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:132 introspection_encrypted_response_enc: ['introspection_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  4. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:133 request_object_encryption_enc: ['request_object_encryption_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  5. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:134 userinfo_encrypted_response_enc: ['userinfo_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  6. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3729 'A128CBC-HS256',
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3749 'A128CBC-HS256',
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3769 'A128CBC-HS256',
  10. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3789 'A128CBC-HS256',
  11. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3809 'A128CBC-HS256',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-128-KW Reduced margin 9 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:19 'ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3589 'A128KW',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3618 'A128KW',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3647 'A128KW',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3677 'A128KW',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3707 'A128KW',
  8. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:119 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
  9. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:127 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-128-GCM Reduced margin 7 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3730 'A128GCM',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3750 'A128GCM',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3770 'A128GCM',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3790 'A128GCM',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3810 'A128GCM',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-192-KW Reduced margin 4 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:19 'ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:119 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
  4. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:127 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-192-GCM Reduced margin 2 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-128-CBC Reduced margin 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:333 enc: 'A128CBC-HS256',
js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-192-CBC Reduced margin 1 place See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
JWS Could not be determined 4 places See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/actions/credential.js:101 ({ payload } = await jwtVerify(attestationJwt, key, {
  2. lib/actions/credential.js:299 ({ payload } = await jwtVerify(proof, embeddedProofJwk, {
  3. lib/helpers/jwt.js:54 return new CompactSign(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)))
  4. lib/helpers/jwt.js:161 verified = await compactVerify(
jws.operation
JWE Could not be determined 3 places See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:226 const verified = await jose.jwtDecrypt(id, eKey, {
  2. lib/helpers/jwt.js:196 return new CompactEncrypt(Buffer.from(cleartext))
  3. lib/helpers/jwt.js:211 decrypted = await compactDecrypt(
jws.operation
X.509 Could not be determined 2 places See details

X.509 certificate handled in code

A certificate, signing request or revocation list loaded, parsed or created: `x509.load_pem_x509_certificate()`, `x509.ParseCertificate()`, `CertificateFactory.generateCertificate()`, `new X509Certificate()`. Certificates are the longest-lived cryptographic artefacts most systems own.

This code reads or builds a digital identity document. Its key, and how long it stays valid, decide when it has to be replaced.

What to do. Shorten certificate lifetimes now, so re-issuing with a post-quantum key is routine rather than an incident.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:378 return new crypto.X509Certificate(Buffer.from(ctx.get('client-certificate'), 'base64'));
  2. certification/oidc/configuration.js:163 return new crypto.X509Certificate(Buffer.from(ctx.get('client-certificate'), 'base64'));
x509.certificate
X.509 Could not be determined 1 place See details

Certificate verification disabled

TLS certificate or host-name verification switched off: `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, `verify=False`, `ssl.CERT_NONE`, `NoopHostnameVerifier`, `TrustAllStrategy`. Any key exchange is worthless when the peer is not authenticated, post-quantum or not.

This connection accepts any certificate, so it cannot tell the real server from an impostor.

What to do. Verify certificates. Pin a private CA through a trust store instead of switching verification off.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:543 rejectUnauthorized: false,
x509.verification-disabled · CWE-295
unknown Could not be determined 3 places See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

The algorithm could not be established from the source. Usually it is selected while the program runs, but it may equally be that the call gives no clue, or that it is decided somewhere this scan does not reach. Somebody has to check.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. lib/models/client.js:180 return crypto.hash(digest, secret, 'buffer').subarray(0, length);
  2. lib/models/id_token.js:191 ? crypto.hash(digest, payload[claim], 'buffer')
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:192 : crypto.createHash(...digest).update(payload[claim]).digest();
js.hash · CWE-328
unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Cryptographic library in the dependency manifest

A dependency known to implement classical asymmetric cryptography. Its presence is inventory, not a finding about this codebase: the library may never be called with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

The project depends on a cryptography library. Listed so the inventory is complete; it is not by itself a problem.

What to do. Check the version. Several of these libraries have shipped ML-KEM and ML-DSA support since 2024, so the migration may need an upgrade rather than a replacement.

  1. package.json:62 "jose": "^6.2.12",
dep.crypto-library
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 15 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:130 authorization_encrypted_response_enc: ['authorization_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  2. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:131 id_token_encrypted_response_enc: ['id_token_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  3. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:132 introspection_encrypted_response_enc: ['introspection_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  4. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:133 request_object_encryption_enc: ['request_object_encryption_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  5. lib/consts/client_attributes.js:134 userinfo_encrypted_response_enc: ['userinfo_encrypted_response_alg', 'A128CBC-HS256'],
  6. lib/consts/jwa.js:2 'HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512',
  7. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  8. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3441 'HS256',
  9. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3488 'HS256',
  10. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3729 'A128CBC-HS256',
  11. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3749 'A128CBC-HS256',
  12. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3769 'A128CBC-HS256',
  13. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3789 'A128CBC-HS256',
  14. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3809 'A128CBC-HS256',
  15. lib/models/id_token.js:18 case 'HS256':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-256-KW Quantum-safe 9 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:19 'ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3590 'A256KW',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3619 'A256KW',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3648 'A256KW',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3678 'A256KW',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3708 'A256KW',
  8. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:119 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
  9. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:127 available = ['ECDH-ES', 'ECDH-ES+A128KW', 'ECDH-ES+A192KW', 'ECDH-ES+A256KW'];
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
HMAC-SHA512 Quantum-safe 8 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:2 'HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3731 'A256CBC-HS512',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3751 'A256CBC-HS512',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3771 'A256CBC-HS512',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3791 'A256CBC-HS512',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3811 'A256CBC-HS512',
  8. lib/models/id_token.js:28 case 'HS512':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
AES-256-GCM Quantum-safe 7 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:21 'A128GCMKW', 'A192GCMKW', 'A256GCMKW', 'A128KW', 'A192KW', 'A256KW',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3732 'A256GCM',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3752 'A256GCM',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3772 'A256GCM',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3792 'A256GCM',
  7. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3812 'A256GCM',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 7 places See details

Random number generation

`crypto.randomBytes()`, `randomUUID()` or `getRandomValues()`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `Math.random()` is a separate, present-day defect.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:105 const eKey = crypto.randomBytes(32);
  2. certification/fapi/index.js:369 nonceSecret: crypto.randomBytes(32),
  3. certification/fapi/index.js:505 ctx.set('x-fapi-interaction-id', ctx.get('x-fapi-interaction-id') || crypto.randomUUID());
  4. certification/oidc/configuration.js:173 nonceSecret: crypto.randomBytes(32),
  5. certification/oidc/index.js:53 ctx.res.locals.cspNonce = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64');
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:277 return crypto.randomBytes(64).toString('base64url');
  7. lib/shared/xsrf.js:7 const secret = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('hex');
js.rng
AES-256-CBC Quantum-safe 6 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  2. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3731 'A256CBC-HS512',
  3. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3751 'A256CBC-HS512',
  4. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3771 'A256CBC-HS512',
  5. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3791 'A256CBC-HS512',
  6. lib/helpers/defaults.js:3811 'A256CBC-HS512',
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-44 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:104 if (SubtleCrypto.supports?.('importKey', 'ML-DSA-44')) {
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:12 signingAlgValues.push('ML-DSA-44', 'ML-DSA-65', 'ML-DSA-87');
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:82 case 'ML-DSA-44':
  4. lib/models/id_token.js:32 case 'ML-DSA-44':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-65 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:113 if (SubtleCrypto.supports?.('importKey', 'ML-DSA-65')) {
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:12 signingAlgValues.push('ML-DSA-44', 'ML-DSA-65', 'ML-DSA-87');
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:83 case 'ML-DSA-65':
  4. lib/models/id_token.js:33 case 'ML-DSA-65':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-87 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/oidc/configuration.js:122 if (SubtleCrypto.supports?.('importKey', 'ML-DSA-87')) {
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:12 signingAlgValues.push('ML-DSA-44', 'ML-DSA-65', 'ML-DSA-87');
  3. lib/helpers/initialize_keystore.js:84 case 'ML-DSA-87':
  4. lib/models/id_token.js:34 case 'ML-DSA-87':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
HMAC-SHA384 Quantum-safe 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. lib/consts/jwa.js:2 'HS256', 'HS384', 'HS512',
  2. lib/consts/jwa.js:27 'A128CBC-HS256', 'A128GCM', 'A192CBC-HS384', 'A192GCM', 'A256CBC-HS512', 'A256GCM',
  3. lib/models/id_token.js:23 case 'HS384':
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
HKDF Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. lib/helpers/challenge.js:19 hkdfSync('sha256', secret, sixfourbeify(step), info, 32),
code.named-call
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. certification/fapi/index.js:333 enc: 'A128CBC-HS256',
js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-44 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-65 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-87 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
SHA-384 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. lib/models/id_token.js:24 return 'sha384';
js.hash · CWE-328
SHA-512 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. lib/models/id_token.js:31 return 'sha512';
js.hash · CWE-328
SHAKE256 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. lib/models/id_token.js:35 return ['shake256', { outputLength: 64 }];
js.hash · CWE-328

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
unknown Could not be determined The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach. 32
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 29
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 27
Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 27
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 24
RSA-PSS Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 22
ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 20
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both. 20
AES-128 Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. 19
RSA-OAEP Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 17
AES-256 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 13
AES-128-KW Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. 9
AES-256-KW Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 9
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 7
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 6
ML-DSA-44 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 5
ML-DSA-65 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 5
ML-DSA-87 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 5
JWS Could not be determined A JSON Web Signature whose algorithm comes from the key or the token header at run time. 4
AES-192-KW Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. 4
AES Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. The key size was not visible at this call site, so the weaker case is assumed. 3
JWE Could not be determined A JSON Web Encryption whose algorithms come from the key or the header at run time. 3
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls. 3
X.509 Could not be determined An X.509 certificate, signing request or revocation list, or a signature over one. The algorithm is the key's, which this code does not name. 3
AES-192 Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. 3
EC Quantum-vulnerable An elliptic-curve key pair. The source does not say whether it signs or agrees a shared secret, and the curve alone cannot: the same curve serves both. 1
HKDF Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
X25519 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
SHA-384 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
SHA-512 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
SHAKE256 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
node:crypto the Node crypto module 27