Crypto-View

documenso/documenso

Cryptographic posture

177 cryptographic locations: 1 already broken, 40 quantum-vulnerable, 39 reduced-margin, 19 undetermined, 78 quantum-safe

3 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 1 imported cryptographic library is listed separately. 2360 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 40 Already broken 1 Reduced margin 39 Could not be determined 19 Quantum-safe 78
To address60
Key establishment3
Inventory only1
Total findings178
What was analysed
Branch main
Commit 8707e33c124e4b1a68dde92d5e05178c9aabd0be v2.21.1
Committed 2026-10-22 08:26 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-22 16:07 UTC 28 days ago
Coverage 2360 files, 2055 javascript
208 test files not scanned

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 100 locations Already broken 0 → 1 (up 1) Quantum-vulnerable 7 → 40 (up 33) Reduced margin 14 → 35 (up 21) Could not be determined 9 → 18 (up 9) Quantum-safe 22 → 79 (up 57) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago 8707e33c124e main 55 3 Compare
28 days ago this scan 8707e33c124e main 60 3
28 days ago 8707e33c124e main 56 3 Compare
29 days ago f0ab7c112e3c 9 2 Compare

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

SHA-1 Already broken 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/pdf-names.ts:15 const hashToOpaqueSerial = (label: string): string => bytesToHex(sha1(utf8ToBytes(label))).toUpperCase();
js.hash · CWE-328
ECDSA-P256 Quantum-vulnerable 4 places See details

WebAuthn passkeys registered or verified

`verifyRegistrationResponse()`, `verifyAuthenticationResponse()` or `generateRegistrationOptions()`. Unless told otherwise the library accepts ES256, EdDSA and RS256 passkeys, so each is reported.

This is passkey sign-in. Every kind of passkey in use today relies on a signature a quantum computer could forge.

What to do. Nothing to change yet: no post-quantum WebAuthn algorithm is registered. Keep `supportedAlgorithmIDs` explicit so a new one can be added in one place.

  1. packages/auth/server/routes/passkey.ts:102 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
  2. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey-registration-options.ts:30 const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
  3. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey.ts:73 const verification = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
  4. packages/lib/server-only/document/is-recipient-authorized.ts:246 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
js.webauthn
Ed25519255-bitother/Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable 4 places See details

WebAuthn passkeys registered or verified

`verifyRegistrationResponse()`, `verifyAuthenticationResponse()` or `generateRegistrationOptions()`. Unless told otherwise the library accepts ES256, EdDSA and RS256 passkeys, so each is reported.

This is passkey sign-in. Every kind of passkey in use today relies on a signature a quantum computer could forge.

What to do. Nothing to change yet: no post-quantum WebAuthn algorithm is registered. Keep `supportedAlgorithmIDs` explicit so a new one can be added in one place.

  1. packages/auth/server/routes/passkey.ts:102 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
  2. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey-registration-options.ts:30 const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
  3. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey.ts:73 const verification = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
  4. packages/lib/server-only/document/is-recipient-authorized.ts:246 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
js.webauthn
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 4 places See details

WebAuthn passkeys registered or verified

`verifyRegistrationResponse()`, `verifyAuthenticationResponse()` or `generateRegistrationOptions()`. Unless told otherwise the library accepts ES256, EdDSA and RS256 passkeys, so each is reported.

This is passkey sign-in. Every kind of passkey in use today relies on a signature a quantum computer could forge.

What to do. Nothing to change yet: no post-quantum WebAuthn algorithm is registered. Keep `supportedAlgorithmIDs` explicit so a new one can be added in one place.

  1. packages/auth/server/routes/passkey.ts:102 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
  2. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey-registration-options.ts:30 const options = await generateRegistrationOptions({
  3. packages/lib/server-only/auth/create-passkey.ts:73 const verification = await verifyRegistrationResponse({
  4. packages/lib/server-only/document/is-recipient-authorized.ts:246 const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
js.webauthn
RSA-PSS Quantum-vulnerable 2 places See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:77 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.10': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: null }, // RSASSA-PSS
  2. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:339 policy.signAlgoOid === '1.2.840.113549.1.1.10' ? 'RSA-PSS' : 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5';
code.oid
DSA Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:93 '1.2.840.10040.4.1': { family: 'DSA' },
code.oid
DSA-SHA1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:94 '1.2.840.10040.4.3': { family: 'DSA' }, // dsa-with-SHA1
code.oid
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:156 const curve = resolveEcdsaCurve(credentialInfo.key.curve);
code.named-call
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named in a setting

A setting whose name says it holds an algorithm, given a literal that names one: `withOaepPaddingDigestAlgorithm("SHA-512")`, `signatureAlgorithm = "SHA256withRSA"`, `"digestAlgorithm": "SHA-256"`. The algorithm never reaches a `getInstance()` in this file - it is carried to one somewhere else, often through configuration - so a scan that only reads the factories cannot see it at all.

Something here is configured to use a named algorithm. The code that uses it may be somewhere else entirely, but this is the line that decides which algorithm it is.

What to do. Find what consumes the setting. The migration belongs to that operation; this line is where the choice is actually written down, and usually where it is easiest to change.

config.algorithm-setting · CWE-327
ECDSA-P192192-bitsecg/secp192r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:105 '1.2.840.10045.3.1.1': 'P-192', // secp192r1
code.oid
ECDSA-P224224-bitsecg/secp224r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid
ECDSA-P256256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:102 '1.2.840.10045.3.1.7': 'P-256', // secp256r1
code.oid
ECDSA-P256256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:241 if (named === 'P-256' || named === 'P-384' || named === 'P-521') {
code.curve
ECDSA-P384384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid
ECDSA-P384384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:241 if (named === 'P-256' || named === 'P-384' || named === 'P-521') {
code.curve
ECDSA-P521521-bitsecg/secp521r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid
ECDSA-P521521-bitsecg/secp521r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Key type chosen by a setting

A named curve written as a string - `elliptic_curve="secp256r1"`, `"P-384"` in a list of accepted curves - or an RSA key size in a setting that names RSA (`rsa_key_size=2048`). The curve is reported as ECDSA where the file signs, ECDH where it agrees keys, and EC where it does both or neither.

This setting picks the kind of key the software makes.

What to do. The setting is where the key type changes; keep the list short so a post-quantum option can be added in one place.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:241 if (named === 'P-256' || named === 'P-384' || named === 'P-521') {
code.curve
ECDSA-SHA1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:87 '1.2.840.10045.4.1': { family: 'ECDSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-1' }, // ecdsa-with-SHA1
code.oid
ECDSA-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:88 '1.2.840.10045.4.3.2': { family: 'ECDSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-256' },
code.oid
ECDSA-SHA384 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:89 '1.2.840.10045.4.3.3': { family: 'ECDSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-384' },
code.oid
ECDSA-SHA512 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:90 '1.2.840.10045.4.3.4': { family: 'ECDSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-512' },
code.oid
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Private key committed to the repository

A PEM private-key block. The header names the algorithm where the format is the legacy one; for PKCS#8 the algorithm OID is read out of the DER. A private key in version control is a present-day incident before it is a quantum question.

A secret key is stored in this repository's files. Anyone who can read the repository can use it. This needs attention today, regardless of quantum computers.

What to do. Revoke and rotate the key, then keep key material out of the repository. Record the algorithm in the inventory.

pem.private-key · CWE-321, CWE-327
RSA2048-bit Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Classical key pair generated with Node crypto

`crypto.generateKeyPair()` or its synchronous form. The detector resolves the algorithm through a `promisify()` wrapper and through an import alias, both of which are common enough that missing them would leave real key generation unreported.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures. Node exposes neither yet, so this usually means an addon or a service boundary.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/lib/create-email-domain.ts:89 const { publicKey, privateKey } = await generateKeyPairAsync('rsa', {
js.generatekeypair · CWE-327
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:76 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.1': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: null }, // rsaEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1-MD5 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:80 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.4': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: 'MD5' }, // md5WithRSAEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:81 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.5': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-1' }, // sha1WithRSAEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:82 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.11': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-256' }, // sha256WithRSAEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA384 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:83 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.12': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-384' }, // sha384WithRSAEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA512 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:84 '1.2.840.113549.1.1.13': { family: 'RSA', boundDigest: 'SHA-512' }, // sha512WithRSAEncryption
code.oid
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Algorithm named in a setting

A setting whose name says it holds an algorithm, given a literal that names one: `withOaepPaddingDigestAlgorithm("SHA-512")`, `signatureAlgorithm = "SHA256withRSA"`, `"digestAlgorithm": "SHA-256"`. The algorithm never reaches a `getInstance()` in this file - it is carried to one somewhere else, often through configuration - so a scan that only reads the factories cannot see it at all.

Something here is configured to use a named algorithm. The code that uses it may be somewhere else entirely, but this is the line that decides which algorithm it is.

What to do. Find what consumes the setting. The migration belongs to that operation; this line is where the choice is actually written down, and usually where it is easiest to change.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:338 const signatureAlgorithm: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' | 'RSA-PSS' =
config.algorithm-setting · CWE-327
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Signed URL or webhook signature

A pre-signed S3 URL (`getSignedUrl` from `@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner`, AWS Signature Version 4: HMAC-SHA256), a CloudFront signed URL or cookie (`@aws-sdk/cloudfront-signer`: RSA with SHA-1), or a Stripe webhook check (`stripe.webhooks.constructEvent`: HMAC-SHA256).

This code signs a link, or checks the signature on a message from a payment provider.

What to do. The HMAC schemes need nothing. CloudFront's RSA-SHA1 key pair is the one to track: it is a classical signature whose key the account holds for years.

  1. packages/lib/universal/upload/providers/s3-provider.ts:80 const url = getCloudfrontSignedUrl({
js.signed-url
SHA-256 Reduced margin 5 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. apps/remix/app/routes/api+/branding.logo.organisation.$orgId.ts:54 const etag = `"${Buffer.from(sha256(settings.brandingLogo)).toString('hex')}"`;
  2. apps/remix/app/routes/api+/branding.logo.team.$teamId.ts:47 const etag = `"${Buffer.from(sha256(settings.brandingLogo)).toString('hex')}"`;
  3. apps/remix/server/api/files/files.helpers.ts:114 const etag = Buffer.from(sha256(documentDataToUse)).toString('hex');
  4. apps/remix/server/api/files/files.helpers.ts:204 sha256(
  5. apps/remix/server/api/files/routes/get-envelope-item-pdf.ts:129 const etag = Buffer.from(sha256(documentDataToUse)).toString('hex');
code.named-call
AES Reduced margin 4 places See details

Algorithm named by a constant

A library or project constant whose name is an algorithm, used in code: `JavaAlgorithm.SHA256`, `XMLCipher.AES_128`, Go `crypto.SHA256` and `x509.SHA256WithRSA`, `SignatureMethod.RSA_SHA256`. The holder's name has to say it holds algorithms, so an unrelated `Foo.AES` is left alone.

This line picks an algorithm by name.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation that consumes the constant; this line is where the choice is written down.

  1. packages/lib/constants/app.ts:146 return SignatureLevel.AES;
  2. packages/lib/constants/app.ts:149 if (value !== SignatureLevel.AES && value !== SignatureLevel.QES) {
  3. packages/lib/constants/app.ts:151 message: `NEXT_PRIVATE_SIGNING_CSC_SIGNATURE_LEVEL must be '${SignatureLevel.AES}' or '${SignatureLevel.QES}', got '${value}'.`,
  4. packages/lib/types/signature-level.ts:33 envelope.signatureLevel === SignatureLevel.AES || envelope.signatureLevel === SignatureLevel.QES;
code.algorithm-constant
SHA-256 Reduced margin 3 places See details

Algorithm named by a constant

A library or project constant whose name is an algorithm, used in code: `JavaAlgorithm.SHA256`, `XMLCipher.AES_128`, Go `crypto.SHA256` and `x509.SHA256WithRSA`, `SignatureMethod.RSA_SHA256`. The holder's name has to say it holds algorithms, so an unrelated `Foo.AES` is left alone.

This line picks an algorithm by name.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation that consumes the constant; this line is where the choice is written down.

code.algorithm-constant
SHA-256 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid
SHA-256 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Algorithm named in a setting

A setting whose name says it holds an algorithm, given a literal that names one: `withOaepPaddingDigestAlgorithm("SHA-512")`, `signatureAlgorithm = "SHA256withRSA"`, `"digestAlgorithm": "SHA-256"`. The algorithm never reaches a `getInstance()` in this file - it is carried to one somewhere else, often through configuration - so a scan that only reads the factories cannot see it at all.

Something here is configured to use a named algorithm. The code that uses it may be somewhere else entirely, but this is the line that decides which algorithm it is.

What to do. Find what consumes the setting. The migration belongs to that operation; this line is where the choice is actually written down, and usually where it is easiest to change.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/algorithm-resolver.ts:66 const STRONG_DIGEST_SET = new Set<string>(['SHA-256', 'SHA-384', 'SHA-512']);
config.algorithm-setting · CWE-327
SHA-256 Reduced margin 11 places See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. packages/auth/server/lib/handoff/hash-auth-handoff-nonce.ts:8 return encodeHexLowerCase(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(nonce)));
  2. packages/auth/server/lib/session/session.ts:49 const hashedSessionId = encodeHexLowerCase(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(token)));
  3. packages/auth/server/lib/session/session.ts:80 const sessionId = encodeHexLowerCase(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(token)));
  4. packages/auth/server/lib/utils/is-equal-secret.ts:8 return constantTimeEqual(sha256(encoder.encode(a)), sha256(encoder.encode(b)));
  5. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/signers/capture-signer.ts:81 return sha256(data);
  6. packages/lib/jobs/client/bullmq.ts:308 const hashedKey = Buffer.from(sha256(cacheKey)).toString('hex');
  7. packages/lib/jobs/client/local.ts:26 const hash = Buffer.from(sha256(key)).toString('hex').slice(0, 24);
  8. packages/lib/jobs/client/local.ts:394 const hashedKey = Buffer.from(sha256(cacheKey)).toString('hex');
  9. packages/lib/server-only/embedding/create-embed-signature-key.ts:14 return createHash('sha256').update(`${organisationId}:${normalisedEmail}:${clientUserId}`).digest('hex');
  10. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:12 const keyAsBytes = sha256(key);
  11. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:26 const keyAsBytes = sha256(key);
js.hash · CWE-328
X.509 Could not be determined 5 places See details

X.509 certificate handled in code

A certificate, signing request or revocation list loaded, parsed or created: `x509.load_pem_x509_certificate()`, `x509.ParseCertificate()`, `CertificateFactory.generateCertificate()`, `new X509Certificate()`. Certificates are the longest-lived cryptographic artefacts most systems own.

This code reads or builds a digital identity document. Its key, and how long it stays valid, decide when it has to be replaced.

What to do. Shorten certificate lifetimes now, so re-issuing with a post-quantum key is routine rather than an incident.

  1. packages/lib/server-only/cert/cert-status.ts:27 const certificate = new X509Certificate(Buffer.from(signer.certificate));
  2. packages/signing/transports/google-cloud.ts:11 return parsePem(Buffer.from(chainContents, 'base64').toString('utf-8')).map((block) => block.der);
  3. packages/signing/transports/google-cloud.ts:15 return parsePem(fs.readFileSync(chainFilePath).toString('utf-8')).map((block) => block.der);
  4. packages/signing/transports/google-cloud.ts:23 return parsePem(Buffer.from(certContents, 'base64').toString('utf-8')).map((block) => block.der);
  5. packages/signing/transports/google-cloud.ts:27 return parsePem(fs.readFileSync(certFilePath).toString('utf-8')).map((block) => block.der);
x509.certificate
JWS Could not be determined 1 place See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

jws.operation
PKCS12 Could not be determined 1 place See details

Key store loaded

A key store read in code outside the JCA: a PKCS#12 file handed to a signer, such as `P12Signer.create(p12, passphrase)` in @libpdf/core. Like a JCA `KeyStore`, it is where the application's private keys and certificates live.

This code opens the application's key cupboard: a file holding its private keys and certificates.

What to do. Record which keys this store holds, and where its passphrase comes from.

  1. packages/signing/transports/local.ts:38 return await P12Signer.create(p12, env('NEXT_PRIVATE_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE') || '', {
code.keystore
unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Cryptographic library in the dependency manifest

A dependency known to implement classical asymmetric cryptography. Its presence is inventory, not a finding about this codebase: the library may never be called with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

The project depends on a cryptography library. Listed so the inventory is complete; it is not by itself a problem.

What to do. Check the version. Several of these libraries have shipped ML-KEM and ML-DSA support since 2024, so the migration may need an upgrade rather than a replacement.

  1. packages/lib/package.json:52 "jose": "^6.1.2",
dep.crypto-library
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 35 places See details

Random number generation

`crypto.randomBytes()`, `randomUUID()` or `getRandomValues()`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `Math.random()` is a separate, present-day defect.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action.

  1. apps/remix/app/components/embed/authoring/configure-document-recipients.tsx:64 formId: nanoid(8),
  2. apps/remix/app/components/embed/authoring/configure-document-view.tsx:45 formId: nanoid(8),
  3. apps/remix/server/security-headers.ts:58 crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
  4. packages/auth/server/lib/session/session.ts:31 crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
  5. packages/ee/server-only/lib/send-organisation-account-link-confirmation-email.ts:61 const token = crypto.randomBytes(20).toString('hex');
  6. packages/lib/client-only/hooks/use-embed-popup-auth.ts:407 const nonce = crypto.randomUUID();
  7. packages/lib/jobs/definitions/emails/send-admin-user-created-email.handler.ts:33 token: crypto.randomBytes(18).toString('hex'),
  8. packages/lib/jobs/definitions/internal/seal-document.handler.ts:162 transactionId: nanoid(),
  9. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/setup-2fa.ts:23 const secret = crypto.randomBytes(10);
  10. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/setup-2fa.ts:27 .map(() => crypto.randomBytes(5).toString('hex'))
  11. packages/lib/server-only/analytics/capture-server-event.ts:73 distinctId: userId ? String(userId) : `anon_${crypto.randomUUID()}`,
  12. packages/lib/server-only/organisation/create-organisation-member-invites.ts:108 token: nanoid(32),
  13. packages/lib/server-only/template/create-template-direct-link.ts:82 token: nanoid(),
  14. packages/lib/server-only/template/create-template-direct-link.ts:91 token: nanoid(),
  15. packages/lib/server-only/user/forgot-password.ts:21 const token = crypto.randomBytes(18).toString('hex');
  16. packages/lib/server-only/user/send-confirmation-token.ts:13 const token = crypto.randomBytes(20).toString('hex');
  17. packages/lib/universal/id.ts:7 export const alphaid = customAlphabet('0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz', 21);
  18. packages/lib/universal/id.ts:11 export const fancyId = customAlphabet('abcdefhiklmnorstuvwxyz', 16);
  19. packages/lib/utils/token-verification.ts:15 token: nanoid(32),
  20. packages/prisma/seed/analytics-seed.ts:640 token: nanoid(),
  21. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:148 title: `[TEST] Document ${nanoid(8)} - Draft`,
  22. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:151 title: `[TEST] Document ${nanoid(8)} - Draft`,
  23. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:177 token: nanoid(),
  24. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:238 title: `[TEST] Template ${nanoid(8)} - Draft`,
  25. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:258 token: nanoid(),
  26. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:356 token: nanoid(),
  27. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:447 token: nanoid(),
  28. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:507 token: nanoid(),
  29. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:572 token: nanoid(),
  30. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:701 token: nanoid(),
  31. packages/prisma/seed/documents.ts:787 token: nanoid(),
  32. packages/prisma/seed/medium-account-seed.ts:52 token: nanoid(),
  33. packages/prisma/seed/medium-account-seed.ts:65 token: nanoid(),
  34. packages/prisma/seed/teams.ts:11 const nanoid = customAlphabet('1234567890abcdef', 10);
  35. packages/prisma/seed/users.ts:21 const nanoid = customAlphabet('1234567890abcdef', 10);
js.rng
bcrypt Quantum-safe Renamed import 13 places See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A password hashing or key derivation function. Not a quantum exposure, and part of the inventory: a cryptographic bill of materials that omits how passwords are stored is not complete.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. Argon2id for new work. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count to stay defensible.

  1. packages/auth/server/routes/email-password.ts:120 const isPasswordsSame = await compare(password, user.password);
  2. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/verify-password.ts:18 return await compare(password, user.password);
  3. packages/lib/server-only/auth/hash.ts:10 return bcryptHashSync(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
  4. packages/lib/server-only/auth/hash.ts:14 return bcryptCompareSync(password, hash);
  5. packages/lib/server-only/user/create-user.ts:17 const hashedPassword = await hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
  6. packages/lib/server-only/user/reset-password.ts:47 const isSamePassword = await compare(password, foundToken.user.password || '');
  7. packages/lib/server-only/user/reset-password.ts:53 const hashedPassword = await hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
  8. packages/lib/server-only/user/update-password.ts:52 const isCurrentPasswordValid = await compare(currentPassword, user.password);
  9. packages/lib/server-only/user/update-password.ts:70 const isSamePassword = await compare(password, user.password);
  10. packages/lib/server-only/user/update-password.ts:75 const hashedNewPassword = await hash(password, SALT_ROUNDS);
  11. packages/prisma/seed/analytics-seed.ts:545 password: hashSync(ADMIN_PASSWORD),
  12. packages/prisma/seed/organisations.ts:48 password: hashSync('password'),
  13. packages/prisma/seed/users.ts:44 password: hashSync(password),
js.kdf
HMAC-SHA1 Quantum-safe From a constant 5 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/email/generate-2fa-credentials-from-email.ts:32 const uri = createTOTPKeyURI(ISSUER, email, secret);
  2. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/email/generate-2fa-token-from-email.ts:20 const token = await generateHOTP(secret, counter);
  3. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/email/validate-2fa-token-from-email.ts:27 const hotp = await generateHOTP(secret, counter);
  4. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/setup-2fa.ts:31 const uri = createTOTPKeyURI(ISSUER, accountName, secret);
  5. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/verify-2fa-token.ts:42 const hotp = await generateHOTP(decodedSecret, counter);
code.named-call
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Signed URL or webhook signature

A pre-signed S3 URL (`getSignedUrl` from `@aws-sdk/s3-request-presigner`, AWS Signature Version 4: HMAC-SHA256), a CloudFront signed URL or cookie (`@aws-sdk/cloudfront-signer`: RSA with SHA-1), or a Stripe webhook check (`stripe.webhooks.constructEvent`: HMAC-SHA256).

This code signs a link, or checks the signature on a message from a payment provider.

What to do. The HMAC schemes need nothing. CloudFront's RSA-SHA1 key pair is the one to track: it is a classical signature whose key the account holds for years.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/stripe/webhook/handler.ts:72 const event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(payload, signature, webhookSecret);
  2. packages/lib/universal/upload/providers/s3-provider.ts:58 const url = await getSignedUrl(this.client, command, { expiresIn: ONE_HOUR / ONE_SECOND });
  3. packages/lib/universal/upload/providers/s3-provider.ts:70 const url = await getSignedUrl(this.client, command, { expiresIn: ONE_HOUR / ONE_SECOND });
  4. packages/lib/universal/upload/providers/s3-provider.ts:97 const url = await getSignedUrl(this.client, command, { expiresIn: ONE_HOUR / ONE_SECOND });
js.signed-url
XChaCha20-Poly1305 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Symmetric cipher in use

`createCipheriv('aes-…')` or a ChaCha20 suite. Symmetric encryption is not broken by a quantum computer; the key length is the only question. The suite name carries it.

This is the kind of encryption that quantum computers do not break.

What to do. Use a 256-bit key. No change of algorithm is required.

  1. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:15 const chacha = managedNonce(xchacha20poly1305)(keyAsBytes); // manages nonces for you
  2. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:17 return bytesToHex(chacha.encrypt(dataAsBytes));
  3. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:29 const chacha = managedNonce(xchacha20poly1305)(keyAsBytes); // manages nonces for you
  4. packages/lib/universal/crypto.ts:31 return chacha.decrypt(dataAsBytes);
js.cipher.symmetric
SHA-512 Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. packages/ee/server-only/signing/csc/signers/capture-signer.ts:89 return sha512(data);
  2. packages/lib/server-only/auth/hash.ts:18 return crypto.createHash('sha512').update(input).digest('hex');
js.hash · CWE-328
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Keyed hash in use

`createHmac()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor. Reported so the inventory is complete, and raised only where the underlying digest is MD5 or SHA-1 - which still appears in TOTP and in older protocol implementations.

This is a fingerprint proving a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action, unless the digest is MD5 or SHA-1.

  1. packages/lib/server-only/2fa/email/generate-2fa-credentials-from-email.ts:30 const secret = hmac(sha256, DOCUMENSO_ENCRYPTION_KEY, identity);
js.hmac
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

jws.operation
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

JWT signed with a classical algorithm

A JOSE `alg` value. RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA sign with a quantum-vulnerable key; HS* is an HMAC and is not affected. `alg: 'none'` is reported as a critical defect today.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

js.jwt.algorithm · CWE-327
SHA-384 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid
SHA-384 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

js.hash · CWE-328
SHA-512 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Algorithm named by its object identifier

A quoted OID from the algorithm registries: `'1.2.840.113549.1.1.11'` (sha256WithRSA), `'2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1'` (SHA-256), `'1.2.840.10045.3.1.7'` (P-256), `'1.2.156.10197.1.301'` (SM2). Code that builds or parses ASN.1 - PDF and CMS signing, certificate handling, PKCS#11 - names its algorithms this way, and an OID is exact.

This line names an algorithm by its registered number.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation the OID selects; the table it sits in is usually where a post-quantum OID gets added.

code.oid

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 35
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 35
bcrypt Quantum-safe A password hashing function. Grover offers only a marginal speed-up against a deliberately slow function, so quantum computing is not the concern here. 19
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 18
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 12
unknown Could not be determined The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach. 12
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both. 11
X.509 Could not be determined An X.509 certificate, signing request or revocation list, or a signature over one. The algorithm is the key's, which this code does not name. 5
AES Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. The key size was not visible at this call site, so the weaker case is assumed. 4
Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 4
XChaCha20-Poly1305 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 4
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 3
SHA-512 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 3
ChaCha20-Poly1305 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 3
DSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 2
RSA-PSS Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 2
SHA-384 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 2
JWS Could not be determined A JSON Web Signature whose algorithm comes from the key or the token header at run time. 1
SHA-1 Already broken SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures. 1
PKCS12 Could not be determined A PKCS#12 key store. Its keys' algorithms are whatever was put in it. 1

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
@oslojs/crypto hash functions and constant-time helpers 13
crypto the Node crypto module 12
@node-rs/bcrypt password hashing 6
@noble/ciphers symmetric encryption 3