Crypto-View

certbot/certbot

Cryptographic posture

126 cryptographic locations: 5 already broken, 57 quantum-vulnerable, 13 reduced-margin, 40 undetermined, 11 quantum-safe

29 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 4 imported cryptographic libraries are listed separately. 340 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 57 Already broken 5 Reduced margin 13 Could not be determined 40 Quantum-safe 11
To address81
Key establishment29
Inventory only4
Total findings130
What was analysed
Branch main
Commit 0b98752f94bc07edaebc10567a3b04cb532f6021 Bump certifi to 2026.10.19 (removes emSign roots) (#10812)
Committed 2026-10-21 20:12 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-22 12:40 UTC 28 days ago
Coverage 340 files, 199 python
489 test files not scanned

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 200 locations Already broken 29 → 5 (down 24) Quantum-vulnerable 180 → 67 (down 113) Reduced margin 7 → 15 (up 8) Could not be determined 0 → 40 (up 40) Quantum-safe 12 → 20 (up 8) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago 0b98752f94bc main 93 22 Compare
28 days ago 0b98752f94bc main 92 23 Compare
28 days ago this scan 0b98752f94bc main 81 29
29 days ago e75e7378cd02 175 83 Compare

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

MD5 Already broken 3 places See details

Broken hash function

`hashlib.md5()` or `hashlib.sha1()`. Both have practical collisions. Where the call is annotated `usedforsecurity=False` the finding is recorded as inventory instead.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest.

What to do. SHA-256, or SHA-384 for long-lived signatures.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/account.py:70 hasher = hashlib.md5()
  2. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/account.py:75 hasher = hashlib.new('md5', **cast(Mapping[str, Any], {"usedforsecurity": False}))
  3. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/account.py:82 self.id = hasher.hexdigest()
py.hashlib.weak · CWE-328
RSAES-PKCS1v15 Already broken Recorded traffic Renamed import 1 place See details

PKCS#1 v1.5 padding

`padding.PKCS1v15()`. For encryption this is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style padding oracles today; for signatures it is acceptable but the key is still RSA.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher oracles today, and the underlying RSA is broken by Shor.

What to do. For encryption, OAEP immediately and ML-KEM-768 as the destination.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:373 signature, payload, PKCS1v15(), signature_hash_algorithm
py.cryptography.pkcs1v15 · CWE-327
SHA-1 Already broken 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/ocsp.py:100 builder = builder.add_certificate(cert, issuer, hashes.SHA1())
code.named-call
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic Renamed import 11 places See details

RSA key generated with pyca/cryptography

`rsa.generate_private_key()`. The `key_size` argument is read where it is a literal and reported on the finding; it does not change the classification, because Shor is polynomial in the modulus size.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-KEM-768 for encryption and ML-DSA-65 for signatures.

  1. acme/src/acme/crypto_util.py:81 rsa.RSAPrivateKey,
  2. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:259 key: Union[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey]
  3. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:264 key = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=bits)
  4. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:357 MLKEM1024PublicKey, RSAPublicKey,
  5. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:371 if isinstance(public_key, RSAPublicKey):
  6. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/client.py:199 rsa_key = generate_private_key(
  7. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/renewal.py:754 if isinstance(key, rsa.RSAPrivateKey):
  8. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/storage.py:1095 def _private_key(self) -> Union[RSAPrivateKey, EllipticCurvePrivateKey]:
  9. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/storage.py:1102 return cast(Union[RSAPrivateKey, EllipticCurvePrivateKey], key)
  10. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/storage.py:1111 if isinstance(key, RSAPrivateKey):
  11. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/storage.py:1122 if isinstance(key, RSAPrivateKey):
py.cryptography.rsa · CWE-327
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 6 places See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/apache/tls_configs/current-options-ssl-apache.conf:12 SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-G
  2. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/apache/tls_configs/old-options-ssl-apache.conf:15 SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-G
  3. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx.conf:14 ssl_ciphers "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
  4. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-old.conf:17 ssl_ciphers "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
  5. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-tls12-only.conf:18 ssl_ciphers "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
  6. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-tls13-session-tix-on.conf:17 ssl_ciphers "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 6 places See details

TLS cipher suites pinned in configuration

An `ssl_ciphers`, `SSLCipherSuite` or `ssl-default-bind-ciphers` directive. Every suite available today uses a classical key exchange; a suite naming RC4, DES, 3DES, EXPORT or NULL is broken now.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls.

What to do. Remove anything below TLS 1.2. The key exchange changes when the server software offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/apache/tls_configs/current-options-ssl-apache.conf:12 SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-G
  2. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/apache/tls_configs/old-options-ssl-apache.conf:15 SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-G
  3. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx.conf:13
  4. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-old.conf:16
  5. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-tls12-only.conf:17
  6. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/nginx/tls_configs/options-ssl-nginx-tls13-session-tix-on.conf:16
config.tls-ciphers · CWE-757
RSASSA-PKCS1-SHA256 Quantum-vulnerable Renamed import 2 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:406 def gen_validation(self, account_key: jose.JWK, alg: jose.JWASignature = jose.RS256,
  2. acme/src/acme/client.py:609 alg: jose.JWASignature = jose.RS256, verify_ssl: bool = True,
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
DH Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Public key file

A PEM public-key block. The algorithm is read from the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. Inventory only; a public key is not itself a secret.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/ssl-dhparams.pem:1 -----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
pem.public-key
ECDH-P256256-bitsecg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS key-exchange groups pinned in configuration

An `ssl_ecdh_curve`, `SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves` or `ssl-default-bind-curves` directive, or Go's `CurvePreferences`. The group is the key exchange itself, the part of TLS a quantum computer breaks; a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 is the fix.

This picks how the two sides of an encrypted connection agree on a key. Today's choices are exactly what a future quantum computer breaks.

What to do. Put X25519MLKEM768 first once the server's TLS library offers it (OpenSSL 3.5, BoringSSL, Go 1.24).

config.tls-groups · CWE-757
ECDH-P384384-bitsecg/secp384r1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS key-exchange groups pinned in configuration

An `ssl_ecdh_curve`, `SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves` or `ssl-default-bind-curves` directive, or Go's `CurvePreferences`. The group is the key exchange itself, the part of TLS a quantum computer breaks; a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 is the fix.

This picks how the two sides of an encrypted connection agree on a key. Today's choices are exactly what a future quantum computer breaks.

What to do. Put X25519MLKEM768 first once the server's TLS library offers it (OpenSSL 3.5, BoringSSL, Go 1.24).

config.tls-groups · CWE-757
ECDSA-P256secg/secp256r1 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

Elliptic-curve key generated with pyca/cryptography

`ec.generate_private_key()`. The curve is read from the argument and normalised onto the CycloneDX 1.7 curve registry.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. ML-DSA-65 for signatures. If the key feeds ECDH, treat it as key establishment and prioritise it above signatures.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:274 key = ec.generate_private_key(
py.cryptography.ec · CWE-327
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic Renamed import 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/client.py:203 key = jose.JWKRSA(key=jose.ComparableRSAKey(rsa_key))
code.named-call
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS used in code

A TLS connection, context or setting made in code: `SSLContexts.createDefault()`, `SSLSocketFactory.getDefault()`, `setEnabledProtocols()`, `setEnabledCipherSuites()`, `startHandshake()`, Go `tls.VersionTLS12` and `tls.Dial()`, Python `ssl.create_default_context()`, Node `tls.connect()`, and version names such as `"TLSv1.2"`. Every TLS key exchange in general use is classical, so recorded traffic is exposed.

This code opens or configures an encrypted connection. Its key exchange is the part a future quantum computer breaks, which exposes traffic recorded today.

What to do. TLS 1.3 everywhere, then a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 as the platform offers it.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:392 context = SSL.Context(SSL.TLS_METHOD)
tls.protocol · CWE-757
X25519255-bitother/Curve25519 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS key-exchange groups pinned in configuration

An `ssl_ecdh_curve`, `SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Curves` or `ssl-default-bind-curves` directive, or Go's `CurvePreferences`. The group is the key exchange itself, the part of TLS a quantum computer breaks; a hybrid group such as X25519MLKEM768 is the fix.

This picks how the two sides of an encrypted connection agree on a key. Today's choices are exactly what a future quantum computer breaks.

What to do. Put X25519MLKEM768 first once the server's TLS library offers it (OpenSSL 3.5, BoringSSL, Go 1.24).

config.tls-groups · CWE-757
TLS-1.2 Quantum-vulnerable 6 places See details

TLS versions pinned in configuration

An `ssl_protocols` or `SSLProtocol` directive. SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are withdrawn.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls.

What to do. TLS 1.2 as the floor, TLS 1.3 preferred.

config.tls-protocols · CWE-757
TLS-1.3 Quantum-vulnerable 4 places See details

TLS versions pinned in configuration

An `ssl_protocols` or `SSLProtocol` directive. SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are withdrawn.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls.

What to do. TLS 1.2 as the floor, TLS 1.3 preferred.

config.tls-protocols · CWE-757
SHA-256 Reduced margin 3 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/webroot.py:269 sha256sum = crypto_util.sha256sum(web_config_path)
  2. certbot/src/certbot/plugins/common.py:396 current_hash = crypto_util.sha256sum(src_path)
  3. certbot/src/certbot/plugins/common.py:413 active_file_digest = crypto_util.sha256sum(dest_path)
code.named-call
SHA-256 Reduced margin 1 place See details

Algorithm named by a constant

A library or project constant whose name is an algorithm, used in code: `JavaAlgorithm.SHA256`, `XMLCipher.AES_128`, Go `crypto.SHA256` and `x509.SHA256WithRSA`, `SignatureMethod.RSA_SHA256`. The holder's name has to say it holds algorithms, so an unrelated `Foo.AES` is left alone.

This line picks an algorithm by name.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation that consumes the constant; this line is where the choice is written down.

  1. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:114 thumbprint_hash_function = hashes.SHA256
code.algorithm-constant
SHA-256 Reduced margin Renamed import 6 places See details

Hash function in use

`hashlib.sha256()` and friends. The digest is read from the call, so SHA-384 and above are inventory while the broken ones are reported separately.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:139 thumbprint = jose.b64encode(account_public_key.thumbprint(
  2. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:177 account_key.thumbprint(
  3. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:265 return jose.b64encode(hashlib.sha256(self.key_authorization(
  4. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:563 sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
  5. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:566 return sha256.hexdigest()
  6. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/main.py:1018 thumbprint = b64.b64encode(acc.key.thumbprint()).decode()
py.hashlib
X.509 Could not be determined 31 places See details

X.509 certificate handled in code

A certificate, signing request or revocation list loaded, parsed or created: `x509.load_pem_x509_certificate()`, `x509.ParseCertificate()`, `CertificateFactory.generateCertificate()`, `new X509Certificate()`. Certificates are the longest-lived cryptographic artefacts most systems own.

This code reads or builds a digital identity document. Its key, and how long it stays valid, decide when it has to be replaced.

What to do. Shorten certificate lifetimes now, so re-issuing with a post-quantum key is routine rather than an incident.

  1. acme/src/acme/client.py:123 csr = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(csr_pem)
  2. acme/src/acme/client.py:225 csr = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(orderr.csr_pem)
  3. acme/src/acme/client.py:340 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_pem)
  4. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:159 req = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(csr)
  5. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:176 req = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(csr)
  6. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:196 csr = x509.load_der_x509_csr(data)
  7. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:199 csr = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(data)
  8. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:227 csr = x509.load_der_x509_csr(data)
  9. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:230 csr = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(data)
  10. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:340 chain = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(chain_file.read(), default_backend())
  11. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:342 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_file.read(), default_backend())
  12. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:452 x509_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert)
  13. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:455 x509_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert)
  14. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:487 x509_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert)
  15. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:490 x509_cert = x509.load_der_x509_certificate(cert)
  16. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:515 x509_req = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(csr)
  17. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:518 x509_req = x509.load_der_x509_csr(csr)
  18. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:534 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read())
  19. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:548 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read())
  20. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:602 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_pem)
  21. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:619 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read())
  22. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:639 top_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(certs[-1], default_backend())
  23. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/client.py:837 csr_obj = x509.load_der_x509_csr(csr.data)
  24. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/cli/helpful.py:334 x509_req = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(util_csr.data)
  25. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/main.py:1386 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(f.read())
  26. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/main.py:1510 x509_req = x509.load_pem_x509_csr(util_csr.data)
  27. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/ocsp.py:72 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(file_handler.read(), default_backend())
  28. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/ocsp.py:96 issuer = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(file_handler.read(), default_backend())
  29. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/ocsp.py:98 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(file_handler.read(), default_backend())
  30. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/renewal.py:422 cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_pem)
  31. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/storage.py:960 x509_cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(cert_bytes)
x509.certificate
JWS Could not be determined Renamed import 4 places See details

Signed token created or verified

A JSON Web Signature or JWT is signed or verified with a key chosen at run time: go-jose `jose.NewSigner()`, `jose.Signed()`, `jws.Verify(key)`, `token.Claims(key, &out)`; josepy `JWS.sign()`; the `jose` npm package's `SignJWT` and `jwtVerify()`. Where the code names the `alg`, that is reported separately.

This code signs or checks a login token. Its algorithm is set by the key it is given.

What to do. Pin the accepted `alg` values, and keep token lifetimes short.

  1. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:417 return jose.JWS.sign(
  2. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:429 if not validation.verify(key=account_public_key):
  3. acme/src/acme/client.py:656 return jws.JWS.sign(jobj, **cast(Mapping[str, Any], kwargs)).json_dumps(indent=2)
  4. acme/src/acme/messages.py:321 eab = jws.JWS.sign(key_json, jose.jwk.JWKOct(key=decoded_hmac_key),
jws.operation
X.509 Could not be determined 4 places See details

Certificate signed or verified

A certificate or signing request is signed - `x509.CreateCertificate()`, a pyca `builder.sign()`, a Bouncy Castle `certBuilder.build(signer)` - or its signature or chain is checked: `CheckSignature()`, `Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{})`, `CertPathValidator`, `is_signature_valid`. The algorithm is the signing key's.

This code puts a signature on a digital identity document, or checks one.

What to do. Find the key behind the signature. Issuing certificates is where an ML-DSA key eventually goes, and the relying parties that verify them have to accept it first.

  1. acme/src/acme/crypto_util.py:140 csr = builder.sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
  2. acme/src/acme/crypto_util.py:304 return builder.sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
  3. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:160 return req.is_signature_valid
  4. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:178 return req.is_signature_valid and req.public_key() == pkey.public_key()
x509.signature
X.509 Could not be determined 1 place See details

Certificate verification disabled

TLS certificate or host-name verification switched off: `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, `rejectUnauthorized: false`, `verify=False`, `ssl.CERT_NONE`, `NoopHostnameVerifier`, `TrustAllStrategy`. Any key exchange is worthless when the peer is not authenticated, post-quantum or not.

This connection accepts any certificate, so it cannot tell the real server from an impostor.

What to do. Verify certificates. Pin a private CA through a trust store instead of switching verification off.

  1. acme/src/acme/challenges.py:325 http_response = requests.get(uri, verify=False, timeout=timeout)
x509.verification-disabled · CWE-295
unknown Could not be determined 4 places See details

Cryptographic library in the dependency manifest

A dependency known to implement classical asymmetric cryptography. Its presence is inventory, not a finding about this codebase: the library may never be called with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

The project depends on a cryptography library. Listed so the inventory is complete; it is not by itself a problem.

What to do. Check the version. Several of these libraries have shipped ML-KEM and ML-DSA support since 2024, so the migration may need an upgrade rather than a replacement.

  1. acme/pyproject.toml:29 "cryptography>=47.0.0",
  2. certbot-ci/pyproject.toml:29 "cryptography",
  3. certbot/setup.py:32 'cryptography>=47.0.0',
  4. tools/requirements.txt:35 cryptography==50.0.2 ; python_version >= "3.10" and python_version < "4.0"
dep.crypto-library
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe Renamed import 3 places See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. acme/src/acme/messages.py:303 directory: Directory, hmac_alg: str = "HS256") -> dict[str, Any]:
  2. acme/src/acme/messages.py:311 "HS256": jose.jwa.HS256,
  3. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/constants.py:85 eab_hmac_alg="HS256",
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Random number generation

`secrets.token_bytes()`, `os.urandom()` or `ssl.RAND_bytes()`. Recorded so the inventory names its randomness source.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action. `random.random()` is a separate, present-day defect if it reaches key material.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/_internal/plugins/apache/apache_util.py:119 return binascii.hexlify(os.urandom(16)).decode("utf-8")
py.rng
HMAC-SHA384 Quantum-safe Renamed import 1 place See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. acme/src/acme/messages.py:312 "HS384": jose.jwa.HS384,
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
HMAC-SHA512 Quantum-safe Renamed import 1 place See details

JOSE algorithm declared in configuration

An `alg` value in JSON or YAML. `none` is reported as a critical defect; HS* is an HMAC and is not quantum-vulnerable; RS*, PS*, ES* and EdDSA are.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised post-quantum JOSE algorithm exists yet. Keep token lifetimes short.

  1. acme/src/acme/messages.py:313 "HS512": jose.jwa.HS512,
jose.algorithm · CWE-327
ML-DSA-44 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Post-quantum algorithm in use

`cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.mlkem` and its ML-DSA and SLH-DSA siblings, or a call into liboqs, `pqcrypto` or `kyber`/`dilithium` bindings. The class names carry the parameter set - `MLKEM768PrivateKey` is ML-KEM-768 - so the finding names the concrete algorithm rather than the family. Recorded so the inventory shows completed migration work.

This is already a quantum-safe algorithm.

What to do. None. Confirm the parameter set matches the required NIST category.

py.pqc
ML-DSA-65 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Post-quantum algorithm in use

`cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.mlkem` and its ML-DSA and SLH-DSA siblings, or a call into liboqs, `pqcrypto` or `kyber`/`dilithium` bindings. The class names carry the parameter set - `MLKEM768PrivateKey` is ML-KEM-768 - so the finding names the concrete algorithm rather than the family. Recorded so the inventory shows completed migration work.

This is already a quantum-safe algorithm.

What to do. None. Confirm the parameter set matches the required NIST category.

py.pqc
ML-DSA-87 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Post-quantum algorithm in use

`cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.mlkem` and its ML-DSA and SLH-DSA siblings, or a call into liboqs, `pqcrypto` or `kyber`/`dilithium` bindings. The class names carry the parameter set - `MLKEM768PrivateKey` is ML-KEM-768 - so the finding names the concrete algorithm rather than the family. Recorded so the inventory shows completed migration work.

This is already a quantum-safe algorithm.

What to do. None. Confirm the parameter set matches the required NIST category.

py.pqc
ML-KEM-1024 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Post-quantum algorithm in use

`cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.mlkem` and its ML-DSA and SLH-DSA siblings, or a call into liboqs, `pqcrypto` or `kyber`/`dilithium` bindings. The class names carry the parameter set - `MLKEM768PrivateKey` is ML-KEM-768 - so the finding names the concrete algorithm rather than the family. Recorded so the inventory shows completed migration work.

This is already a quantum-safe algorithm.

What to do. None. Confirm the parameter set matches the required NIST category.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:357 MLKEM1024PublicKey, RSAPublicKey,
py.pqc
ML-KEM-768 Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Post-quantum algorithm in use

`cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.mlkem` and its ML-DSA and SLH-DSA siblings, or a call into liboqs, `pqcrypto` or `kyber`/`dilithium` bindings. The class names carry the parameter set - `MLKEM768PrivateKey` is ML-KEM-768 - so the finding names the concrete algorithm rather than the family. Recorded so the inventory shows completed migration work.

This is already a quantum-safe algorithm.

What to do. None. Confirm the parameter set matches the required NIST category.

  1. certbot/src/certbot/crypto_util.py:356 MLDSA65PublicKey, MLDSA87PublicKey, MLKEM768PublicKey,
py.pqc

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
X.509 Could not be determined An X.509 certificate, signing request or revocation list, or a signature over one. The algorithm is the key's, which this code does not name. 36
RSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 27
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls. 23
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 13
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 5
JWS Could not be determined A JSON Web Signature whose algorithm comes from the key or the token header at run time. 4
MD5 Already broken Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest. 3
ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 2
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both. 2
DH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
SHA-1 Already broken SHAttered and subsequent work produced practical collisions; NIST withdrew SHA-1 in 2030 guidance and it is already unacceptable for signatures. 1
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 1
X25519 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
ML-DSA-44 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
ML-DSA-65 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
ML-DSA-87 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
ML-KEM-768 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
ML-KEM-1024 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 1
RSAES-PKCS1v15 Already broken PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher oracles today, and the underlying RSA is broken by Shor. 1

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
cryptography pyca/cryptography 13
hashlib the standard digests, including the broken ones 3