Crypto-View

BlueWallet/BlueWallet

Cryptographic posture

308 cryptographic locations: 3 already broken, 127 quantum-vulnerable, 101 reduced-margin, 4 undetermined, 73 quantum-safe

5 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 1 imported cryptographic library is listed separately. 886 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 127 Already broken 3 Reduced margin 101 Could not be determined 4 Quantum-safe 73
To address130
Key establishment5
Inventory only1
Total findings309
What was analysed
Branch master
Commit 9ab299f32770e51d7839ff9bd5f25f97bba68053 ADD: declare supported localizations (CFBundleLocalizations) so the App Store lists all well-translated languages (#8984)
Committed 2026-10-20 23:18 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-22 12:40 UTC 28 days ago
Coverage 886 files, 2 python, 379 javascript
128 test files not scanned

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 200 locations Already broken 2 → 4 (up 2) Quantum-vulnerable 180 → 133 (down 47) Reduced margin 15 → 101 (up 86) Could not be determined 7 → 4 (down 3) Quantum-safe 4 → 75 (up 71) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago 9ab299f32770 master 137 5 Compare
28 days ago 9ab299f32770 master 130 5 Compare
28 days ago this scan 9ab299f32770 master 130 5
29 days ago 969b5718b0f3 98 0 Compare

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

MD5 Already broken From a constant 2 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. blue_modules/encryption.ts:59 const kdf = evpBytesToKeyMd5(stringToUint8Array(password), salt, KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
  2. blue_modules/encryption.ts:83 const kdf = evpBytesToKeyMd5(stringToUint8Array(password), salt, KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
code.named-call
MD5 Already broken 1 place See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. blue_modules/encryption.ts:31 prev = md5(concatUint8Arrays([prev, password, salt]));
js.hash · CWE-328
ECDSA-secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable 42 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Bitcoin-family keys are additionally exposed because public keys are published on-chain, so the attacker does not have to wait for a signature.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/multisig-cosigner.ts:184 bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  2. class/payjoin-transaction.ts:105 unfinalized.signInput(index, ECPair.fromWIF(wif));
  3. class/payjoin-transaction.ts:132 payjoinPsbt.signInput(index, ECPair.fromWIF(wif)).finalizeInput(index);
  4. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:212 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub).derive(node);
  5. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1094 keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this._getWifForAddress(String(input.address)));
  6. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1164 psbt.signInput(cc, keypairs[cc]);
  7. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1389 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(wif);
  8. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1391 psbt.signInput(cc, keyPair);
  9. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1556 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(inputsTemp[0].wif);
  10. class/wallets/hd-legacy-breadwallet-wallet.ts:35 _node = this._node0 || (this._node0 = bip32.fromBase58(this.getXpub()).derive(node));
  11. class/wallets/hd-legacy-breadwallet-wallet.ts:38 _node = this._node1 || (this._node1 = bip32.fromBase58(this.getXpub()).derive(node));
  12. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:58 const node = bip32.fromBase58(this.getXpub());
  13. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:73 const node = bip32.fromBase58(this.getXpub());
  14. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:100 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  15. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:106 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  16. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:63 const node = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  17. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:79 const node = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  18. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:106 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  19. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:112 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  20. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:70 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  21. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:80 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  22. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:556 psbt.signInput(cc, keyPair);
  23. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:694 const signature = bitcoinMessage.sign(message, Buffer.from(privateKey), keyPair.compressed, options);
  24. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:709 return bitcoinMessage.verify(message, address, signature, undefined, true);
  25. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:715 return bitcoinMessage.verify(message, address, signature);
  26. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:187 bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  27. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:197 bip32.fromBase58(xprv);
  28. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:268 const restored = bip32.fromBase58(MultisigHDWallet.convertMultisigXprvToRegularXprv(xprv));
  29. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:318 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  30. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:773 const hdNode0 = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
  31. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1219 hdRoot = bip32.fromBase58(xprv);
  32. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1264 const keyPair = ECPair.fromPrivateKey(child.privateKey);
  33. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1266 psbt.signInput(cc, keyPair);
  34. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:25 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  35. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:89 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  36. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:128 psbt.signInput(cc, keyPair);
  37. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:67 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  38. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:107 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  39. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:148 psbt.signInput(cc, keyPair);
  40. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:62 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  41. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:94 const keyPair = ECPair.fromWIF(this.secret);
  42. class/wallets/watch-only-wallet.ts:310 const hdNode = bip32.fromBase58(xpub);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
ECDH-secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 5 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1070 const sp = new SilentPayment();
  2. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1707 const hdNode = bip47_instance.getPaymentWallet(remotePaymentNode, index);
  3. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1725 const hdNode = this.getBIP47FromSeed().getReceiveWallet(BIP47Factory(ecc).fromPaymentCode(paymentCode).getPaymentCodeNode(), index);
  4. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1752 const hdNode = bip47_instance.getPaymentWallet(remotePaymentNode, index);
  5. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1760 const hdNode = bip47_instance.getPaymentWallet(remotePaymentNode, index);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
ECDSA-secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable Renamed import 3 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:178 return necc.sign(h, d, { prehash: false, extraEntropy: e });
  2. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:182 return compactToDER(necc.sign(h, d, { prehash: false, extraEntropy: e }));
  3. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:190 return necc.verify(signature, h, Q, { prehash: false, lowS: strict !== false });
code.named-call
Schnorr Quantum-vulnerable Renamed import 2 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:186 return necc.schnorr.sign(h, d, e);
  2. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:194 return necc.schnorr.verify(signature, h, Q);
code.named-call
Schnorr-secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable 2 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. BIP-340 Schnorr is a discrete-logarithm signature.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1159 psbt.signTaprootInput(
  2. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:135 psbt.signTaprootInput(idx, keyPair.tweak(bitcoin.crypto.taggedHash('TapTweak', xOnlyPub)));
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
ECDSA-secp256k1secg/secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable Renamed import 1 place See details

Noble cryptography library in use

A `@noble/curves`, `@noble/secp256k1` or `@noble/ed25519` import. These are the modern audited JavaScript curve implementations, and every curve they offer is broken by Shor. `@noble/hashes` is inventoried separately and is not quantum-vulnerable.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Bitcoin-family keys are additionally exposed because public keys are published on-chain, so the attacker does not have to wait for a signature.

What to do. `@noble/post-quantum` provides ML-KEM and ML-DSA from the same authors.

  1. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:143 throwToNull(() => necc.getPublicKey(sk, defaultTrue(compressed))),
js.noble · CWE-327
RIPEMD-160 Reduced margin 32 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. A 160-bit digest, used in Bitcoin address derivation. Grover halves the pre-image margin; the 80-bit collision margin is the nearer concern.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1185 const p2wpkh = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey });
  2. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1238 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  3. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1250 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2pkh({
  4. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1265 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  5. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1266 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey: hdNode.publicKey }),
  6. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:110 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  7. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:126 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  8. class/wallets/hd-legacy-breadwallet-wallet.ts:46 const address = p2wpkh ? bitcoinjs.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey }).address : bitcoinjs.payments.p2pkh({ pubkey }).address;
  9. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:59 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2pkh({
  10. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:74 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2pkh({
  11. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:64 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  12. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:80 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  13. class/wallets/hd-segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:86 const p2wpkh = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey });
  14. class/wallets/hd-segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:87 const p2sh = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({ redeem: p2wpkh });
  15. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:84 address = bitcoin.payments.p2pkh({
  16. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:617 bitcoin.payments.p2pkh({
  17. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:329 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  18. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:349 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  19. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:825 const p2shP2wsh = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  20. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:853 const p2sh = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  21. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:890 const p2shP2wsh = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  22. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:30 address = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  23. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:45 bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  24. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:65 bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
  25. class/wallets/segwit-bech32-wallet.ts:95 const p2wpkh = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey });
  26. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:19 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  27. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:20 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey }),
  28. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:53 bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  29. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:113 const p2wpkh = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey });
  30. class/wallets/segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:114 const p2sh = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({ redeem: p2wpkh });
  31. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:270 const address = bitcoin.payments.p2sh({
  32. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:271 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 Reduced margin 15 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Not broken by a quantum computer, but weak against modern GPU cracking at low iteration counts, which is a present-day concern.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1421 const seed = bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, passphrase);
  2. class/wallets/abstract-hd-wallet.ts:80 return bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, passphrase);
  3. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:49 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  4. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:88 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  5. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:49 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  6. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:94 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  7. class/wallets/lightning-ark-wallet.ts:144 const seed = bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic);
  8. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:233 mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, electrumStandart(passphrase));
  9. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:237 mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, electrumSegwit(passphrase));
  10. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:377 seed = bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, passphrase);
  11. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1039 : bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(cosigner, passphrase);
  12. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1060 seed = mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(cosigner.replace(ELECTRUM_SEED_PREFIX, ''), electrumSegwit(passphrase));
  13. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1063 seed = mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(cosigner.replace(ELECTRUM_SEED_PREFIX, ''), electrumStandart(passphrase));
  14. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1224 : bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(cosigner, passphrase);
  15. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:265 const seed = bip39.mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
SHA-256 Reduced margin 12 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1161 keypairs[cc].tweak(bitcoin.crypto.taggedHash('TapTweak', psbt.data.inputs[cc].tapInternalKey as Uint8Array)),
  2. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:50 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2tr({
  3. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:105 const p2tr = bitcoin.payments.p2tr({
  4. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:330 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  5. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:340 const { address } = bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  6. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:802 const p2wsh = bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  7. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:826 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  8. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:891 redeem: bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  9. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:909 const p2wsh = bitcoin.payments.p2wsh({
  10. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:68 address = bitcoin.payments.p2tr({
  11. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:99 const p2tr = bitcoin.payments.p2tr({
  12. class/wallets/taproot-wallet.ts:135 psbt.signTaprootInput(idx, keyPair.tweak(bitcoin.crypto.taggedHash('TapTweak', xOnlyPub)));
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
SHA-256 Reduced margin 7 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:193 const password = uint8ArrayToHex(bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(stringToUint8Array('fyegjitkyf[eqjnc.lf')));
  2. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:750 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
  3. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:787 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
  4. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:800 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
  5. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:1011 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
  6. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:1055 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
  7. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:1105 const hash = bitcoinjs_crypto_sha256(script);
code.named-call
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 Reduced margin 2 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Not broken by a quantum computer, but weak against modern GPU cracking at low iteration counts, which is a present-day concern.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/slip39-wallets.ts:18 const master = slip39.recoverSecret(self.secret, self.passphrase);
  2. class/wallets/slip39-wallets.ts:27 slip39.recoverSecret(self.secret);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
AES Reduced margin 1 place See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. screen/lnd/lnurlPaySuccess.tsx:52 setMessage(Lnurl.decipherAES(successAction.ciphertext, preimage, successAction.iv));
code.named-call
SHA-256 Reduced margin Renamed import 1 place See details

Algorithm named by a constant

A library or project constant whose name is an algorithm, used in code: `JavaAlgorithm.SHA256`, `XMLCipher.AES_128`, Go `crypto.SHA256` and `x509.SHA256WithRSA`, `SignatureMethod.RSA_SHA256`. The holder's name has to say it holds algorithms, so an unrelated `Foo.AES` is left alone.

This line picks an algorithm by name.

What to do. The migration belongs to the operation that consumes the constant; this line is where the choice is written down.

  1. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:30 necc.hashes.sha256 = sha256 as NonNullable<typeof necc.hashes.sha256>;
code.algorithm-constant
SHA-256 Reduced margin Renamed import 14 places See details

Hash function in use

`createHash()` or `subtle.digest()`. The digest is read from the argument, so one rule covers the family: MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as broken, SHA-256 as a reduced margin, SHA-384 and above as inventory.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something long-lived.

  1. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:186 return _sha256(buffer);
  2. blue_modules/checksumWords.ts:58 const hash = sha256(new Uint8Array(entropy));
  3. blue_modules/clipboardPayment.ts:37 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(content));
  4. class/blue-app.ts:276 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(s));
  5. class/lnurl.ts:192 const metadataHash = uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(this._lnurlPayServicePayload.metadata));
  6. class/wallets/abstract-wallet.ts:84 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(string2hash));
  7. class/wallets/abstract-wallet.ts:228 if (uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(`${newSecret}?`)).startsWith('00')) {
  8. class/wallets/abstract-wallet.ts:230 newSecret = wif.encode(0x80, Buffer.from(sha256(newSecret)), false);
  9. class/wallets/lightning-ark-wallet.ts:136 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(s));
  10. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1120 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(string2hash));
  11. class/wallets/slip39-wallets.ts:71 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(string2hash));
  12. screen/send/ScanQRCode.tsx:96 return uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(s));
  13. screen/transactions/TransactionStatus.tsx:1029 const digest = sha256(paymentCode);
  14. screen/wallets/PaymentCodesList.tsx:204 const color = uint8ArrayToHex(sha256(pc)).substring(0, 6);
js.hash · CWE-328
AES-CBC Reduced margin 3 places See details

Symmetric cipher in use

`createCipheriv('aes-…')` or a ChaCha20 suite. Symmetric encryption is not broken by a quantum computer; the key length is the only question. The suite name carries it.

This is the kind of encryption that quantum computers do not break.

What to do. Use a 256-bit key. No change of algorithm is required.

  1. blue_modules/encryption.ts:62 const ciphertext = cbc(key, iv).encrypt(stringToUint8Array(data));
  2. blue_modules/encryption.ts:86 const plain = cbc(key, iv).decrypt(ciphertext);
  3. class/lnurl.ts:337 const pt = cbc(key, iv).decrypt(ct);
js.cipher.symmetric
unknown Could not be determined 3 places See details

Release signed by the build

`apksigner sign`, `jarsigner`, `codesign` or `signtool` in a build script or a CI workflow. The key it uses signs what customers install, so it outlives every key inside the application and is usually the last one anybody thinks to migrate. The algorithm is deliberately not claimed: a keystore can hold RSA, DSA or EC and the command does not say which.

This is where a release gets signed. The signing key is not in the code, but the code says it exists - and a signing key is usually the hardest one to replace.

What to do. Find the key this command loads and record its algorithm in the inventory. Platform signing formats move on the platform's schedule, not yours, so the useful work now is knowing which key it is and who holds it.

  1. reproducible-builds/inside-docker.sh:23 apksigner sign \
  2. reproducible-builds/inside-docker.sh:41 apksigner sign \
  3. scripts/build-release-apk.sh:28 $ANDROID_HOME/build-tools/36.0.0/apksigner sign --ks ./bluewallet-release-key.keystore --ks-pass=pass:$KEYSTORE_PASSWORD "./app/build/outputs/apk/release/BlueWallet-${VERSION_NAME}($BUILD_NUMBER).apk"
build.code-signing · CWE-327
unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Cryptographic library in the dependency manifest

A dependency known to implement classical asymmetric cryptography. Its presence is inventory, not a finding about this codebase: the library may never be called with a quantum-vulnerable algorithm.

The project depends on a cryptography library. Listed so the inventory is complete; it is not by itself a problem.

What to do. Check the version. Several of these libraries have shipped ML-KEM and ML-DSA support since 2024, so the migration may need an upgrade rather than a replacement.

  1. package.json:135 "bitcoinjs-lib": "7.0.2",
dep.crypto-library
HMAC-SHA512 Quantum-safe 41 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:198 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  2. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:200 const child = root.derivePath(path);
  3. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:258 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  4. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:264 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  5. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1373 const hdRoot = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  6. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1410 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  7. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:1452 this._bip47_instance = bip47.fromBip39Seed(this.secret, undefined, this.passphrase);
  8. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:50 const root = bip32.fromSeed(this._getEntropyCached());
  9. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:53 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  10. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:93 const root = bip32.fromSeed(this._getEntropyCached());
  11. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:94 const node = root.derivePath("m/84'/0'/0'");
  12. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:99 const root = bip32.fromSeed(this._getEntropyCached());
  13. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:100 const node = root.derivePath("m/84'/0'/0'");
  14. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:138 const root = bip32.fromSeed(this._getEntropyCached());
  15. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:140 const child = root.derivePath(path);
  16. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:168 const root = bip32.fromSeed(this._getEntropyCached());
  17. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:169 const node = root.derivePath("m/1017'/0'/6'/0/0");
  18. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:49 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  19. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:88 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  20. class/wallets/hd-legacy-electrum-seed-p2pkh-wallet.ts:90 const child = root.derivePath(path);
  21. class/wallets/hd-legacy-p2pkh-wallet.ts:55 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  22. class/wallets/hd-legacy-p2pkh-wallet.ts:61 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  23. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:49 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  24. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:50 const xpub = root.derivePath("m/0'").neutered().toBase58();
  25. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:94 const root = bip32.fromSeed(mn.mnemonicToSeedSync(this.secret, args));
  26. class/wallets/hd-segwit-electrum-seed-p2wpkh-wallet.ts:96 const child = root.derivePath(path);
  27. class/wallets/hd-segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:62 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  28. class/wallets/hd-segwit-p2sh-wallet.ts:68 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  29. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:28 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  30. class/wallets/hd-taproot-wallet.ts:34 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  31. class/wallets/lightning-ark-wallet.ts:149 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  32. class/wallets/lightning-ark-wallet.ts:151 const child = root.derivePath(path);
  33. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:380 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  34. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:381 const child = root.derivePath(path).neutered();
  35. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1040 hdRoots.push(bip32.fromSeed(seed));
  36. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1086 const root = bip32.fromSeed(new Uint8Array(32));
  37. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1088 root.derivePath(path);
  38. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1225 hdRoot = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  39. class/wallets/multisig-hd-wallet.ts:1262 const child = hdRoot.derivePath(path);
  40. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:266 const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
  41. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:269 const child = root.derivePath(path);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 7 places See details

Call to code named for an algorithm

A call, construction or operation whose own name states the algorithm: a project's wrapper such as `Hash.sha256(data)`, `hmacSha256(key, msg)`, `getMD5()` or `new ScryptGenerator(..)`, a key type such as `new Ed25519PublicKey(bytes)`, or an operation on an object named for its algorithm, `sha256.digest()`. The library call inside the wrapper is reported where it is written; these are the places it is used.

This line calls code named after an encryption or hashing method.

What to do. Migrate the wrapper once, and these call sites follow it.

  1. blue_modules/arkade-adapters/realm/realmInstance.ts:43 const buf = await randomBytes(64);
  2. class/blue-app.ts:325 const buf = await randomBytes(64);
  3. class/wallets/abstract-hd-electrum-wallet.ts:169 const buf = await randomBytes(16);
  4. class/wallets/legacy-wallet.ts:68 const buf = await randomBytes(32);
  5. class/wallets/lightning-ark-wallet.ts:334 const buf = await randomBytes(16);
  6. screen/wallets/generateWord.tsx:34 const random = await randomBytes(1);
  7. screen/wallets/ProvideEntropy.tsx:332 const random = await randomBytes(remaining);
code.named-call
AES-256-CBC Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Symmetric cipher in use

`createCipheriv('aes-…')` or a ChaCha20 suite. Symmetric encryption is not broken by a quantum computer; the key length is the only question. The suite name carries it.

This is the kind of encryption that quantum computers do not break.

What to do. Use a 256-bit key. No change of algorithm is required.

  1. blue_modules/arkade-adapters/realm/realmInstance.ts:92 const realm = await Realm.open({
  2. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:210 _realm = await Realm.open({
  3. class/blue-app.ts:303 return Realm.open({
  4. class/blue-app.ts:345 return Realm.open({
js.cipher.symmetric
HMAC-SHA224 Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Keyed hash in use

`createHmac()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor. Reported so the inventory is complete, and raised only where the underlying digest is MD5 or SHA-1 - which still appears in TOTP and in older protocol implementations.

This is a fingerprint proving a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action, unless the digest is MD5 or SHA-1.

  1. blue_modules/arkade-adapters/realm/realmInstance.ts:92 const realm = await Realm.open({
  2. blue_modules/BlueElectrum.ts:210 _realm = await Realm.open({
  3. class/blue-app.ts:303 return Realm.open({
  4. class/blue-app.ts:345 return Realm.open({
js.hmac
scrypt Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallet-import.ts:186 const decryptedKey = await bip38.decryptAsync(text, password);
  2. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:69 const cipherSeed1 = await CipherSeed.fromMnemonic(this.secret, passphrase);
  3. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:80 const cipherSeed1 = await CipherSeed.fromMnemonic(this.secret, passphrase);
  4. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:317 const decryptedKey = await bip38.decryptAsync(
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
AES-256-ECB Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallet-import.ts:186 const decryptedKey = await bip38.decryptAsync(text, password);
  2. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:317 const decryptedKey = await bip38.decryptAsync(
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
AEZ Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:69 const cipherSeed1 = await CipherSeed.fromMnemonic(this.secret, passphrase);
  2. class/wallets/hd-aezeed-wallet.ts:80 const cipherSeed1 = await CipherSeed.fromMnemonic(this.secret, passphrase);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
CSPRNG Quantum-safe From a constant 2 places See details

Random number generation

`crypto.randomBytes()`, `randomUUID()` or `getRandomValues()`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `Math.random()` is a separate, present-day defect.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action.

  1. blue_modules/encryption.ts:58 const salt = randomBytes(SALT_LEN);
  2. class/rng.ts:20 rnCrypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
js.rng
HMAC-SHA256 Quantum-safe Renamed import 2 places See details

Keyed hash in use

`createHmac()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor. Reported so the inventory is complete, and raised only where the underlying digest is MD5 or SHA-1 - which still appears in TOTP and in older protocol implementations.

This is a fingerprint proving a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action, unless the digest is MD5 or SHA-1.

  1. blue_modules/noble_ecc.ts:31 necc.hashes.hmacSha256 = ((key: Uint8Array, message: Uint8Array) => hmac(sha256, key, message)) as NonNullable<
  2. class/lnurl.ts:372 const privateKey = hmac(sha256, secret, url.hostname);
js.hmac
Shamir-GF256 Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Cryptocurrency key derivation

A BIP-32 derivation or a secp256k1 operation. Wallet keys are secp256k1, and on a public ledger the public key is usually already visible, so an attacker with a quantum computer does not have to wait to observe a signature.

No known quantum attack changes how strong this is. Secret sharing is information-theoretic; a quantum computer gains nothing.

What to do. No standardised replacement exists for consensus-level signatures. Follow the protocol's own migration plan; an application cannot make this change alone.

  1. class/wallets/slip39-wallets.ts:18 const master = slip39.recoverSecret(self.secret, self.passphrase);
  2. class/wallets/slip39-wallets.ts:27 slip39.recoverSecret(self.secret);
js.wallet.keys · CWE-327
scrypt Quantum-safe 1 place See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A password hashing or key derivation function. Not a quantum exposure, and part of the inventory: a cryptographic bill of materials that omits how passwords are stored is not complete.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. Argon2id for new work. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count to stay defensible.

  1. screen/settings/SelfTest.tsx:309 const hex = await BlueCrypto.scrypt('717765727479', '4749345a22b23cf3', 64, 8, 8, 32); // using non-default parameters to speed it up (not-bip38 compliant)
js.kdf

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
secp256k1 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Bitcoin-family keys are additionally exposed because public keys are published on-chain, so the attacker does not have to wait for a signature. 118
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 48
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 47
RIPEMD-160 Reduced margin A 160-bit digest, used in Bitcoin address derivation. Grover halves the pre-image margin; the 80-bit collision margin is the nearer concern. 32
PBKDF2 Reduced margin Not broken by a quantum computer, but weak against modern GPU cracking at low iteration counts, which is a present-day concern. 17
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 9
AES-256 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 6
ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 5
scrypt Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 5
AES Reduced margin Grover's algorithm halves the effective strength; the parameter, not the design, is the problem. The key size was not visible at this call site, so the weaker case is assumed. 4
Schnorr Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. BIP-340 Schnorr is a discrete-logarithm signature. 4
unknown Could not be determined The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach. 4
MD5 Already broken Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest. 3
AEZ Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 2
Shamir Quantum-safe Secret sharing is information-theoretic; a quantum computer gains nothing. 2
ChaCha20-Poly1305 Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 2

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
bip39 mnemonic seed derivation 46
@noble/hashes hash functions 14
crypto the Node crypto module 1
@noble/ciphers symmetric encryption 2