Crypto-View

Peergos/Peergos

Cryptographic posture

70 cryptographic locations: 7 already broken, 22 quantum-vulnerable, 10 reduced-margin, 17 undetermined, 14 quantum-safe

24 establish keys, so traffic protected by them and recorded today becomes readable once the algorithm falls. 1 imported cryptographic library is listed separately. 873 files analysed.

Quantum-vulnerable 22 Already broken 7 Reduced margin 10 Could not be determined 17 Quantum-safe 14
To address42
Key establishment24
Inventory only1
Total findings71
What was analysed
Branch Not at a branch head The commit was given directly and is not the tip of any branch in the repository.
Commit f2cdc1955e60f3d0f3d34f7057308cfffb972ae2 Version 1.2.0
Committed 2025-04-24 12:50 UTC
Scanned 2026-10-21 15:56 UTC 29 days ago
Coverage 873 files, 857 java

Earlier scans of this repository

4 scans · compare any two
0 to 500 locations Already broken 7 → 7 (unchanged) Quantum-vulnerable 22 → 92 (up 70) Reduced margin 10 → 161 (up 151) Could not be determined 17 → 47 (up 30) Quantum-safe 14 → 257 (up 243) The filled point is the scan you are reading.
Scanned Commit To address Key establishment
27 days ago 3a34dcf620fa master 265 45 Compare
28 days ago d8b413862d28 master 231 45 Compare
28 days ago d8b413862d28 master 263 61 Compare
29 days ago this scan f2cdc1955e60 42 24

A repository is scanned again when someone asks: Run a fresh scan.

List of cryptographic assets

RSAES-PKCS1v15 Already broken Recorded traffic 5 places See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:46 "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256," +
  2. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:47 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256," +
  3. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:48 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, " +
  4. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:49 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, " +
  5. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:50 "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, " +
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
MD5 Already broken 1 place See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

This is already unsafe today, with no quantum computer involved. Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

  1. src/peergos/server/webdav/modeshape/webdav/WebDavServletBean.java:58 MD5_HELPER = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");
java.messagedigest · CWE-328
NULL Already broken 1 place See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:46 "TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256," +
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 15 places See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. README.md:254 ssl_ciphers TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:!TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256;
  2. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:51 "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, " +
  3. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:52 "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, " +
  4. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:53 "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, " +
  5. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:54 "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384," +
  6. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:55 "TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384," +
  7. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:56 "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, " +
  8. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:57 "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384," +
  9. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:58 "TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384," +
  10. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:59 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256," +
  11. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:60 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384," +
  12. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:61 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256," +
  13. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:62 "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,"
  14. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:186 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384",
  15. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:187 "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
DH Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 2 places See details

TLS cipher suite named in source

A cipher suite written into the code rather than into a configuration file - `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`, the OpenSSL spelling `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256`, or a TLS 1.3 suite. Each is reported as a setting of the TLS protocol and listed in its `cipherSuites`; RSA key transport and broken bulk ciphers are reported again, as `config.cipher-suite.weak`.

This code names the exact cryptography its TLS connections may use. Because the list is in the program rather than in a settings file, changing it needs a new release - which is the thing that makes a migration slow.

What to do. A hardcoded suite list ships with the binary and cannot be changed without a release, so move it to configuration first. The key exchange changes when the TLS library offers a hybrid group, not before.

  1. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:188 "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
  2. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:189 "TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"
config.cipher-suite · CWE-757
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

COSE algorithm identifier

A COSE algorithm named as an identifier or as its IANA registry number - `COSEAlgorithmIdentifier.ES256`, or `alg: -7` in a WebAuthn `pubKeyCredParams`. The names match JOSE's; the numbers are the registry's.

This is the list of signature algorithms a security key or a passkey is allowed to use. Every one available today is broken by a quantum computer, so the value of writing it down now is knowing where to look later.

What to do. No post-quantum COSE algorithm is registered for WebAuthn yet. Record the exposure and keep the list short, so there is less to change when one is.

  1. src/peergos/server/tests/StandaloneWebauthnDemo.java:70 test path " pubKeyCredParams: [ {type: \"public-key\", alg: -8}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -7}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -257}]\n" +
cose.algorithm
Ed25519255-bitother/Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

COSE algorithm identifier

A COSE algorithm named as an identifier or as its IANA registry number - `COSEAlgorithmIdentifier.ES256`, or `alg: -7` in a WebAuthn `pubKeyCredParams`. The names match JOSE's; the numbers are the registry's.

This is the list of signature algorithms a security key or a passkey is allowed to use. Every one available today is broken by a quantum computer, so the value of writing it down now is knowing where to look later.

What to do. No post-quantum COSE algorithm is registered for WebAuthn yet. Record the exposure and keep the list short, so there is less to change when one is.

  1. src/peergos/server/tests/StandaloneWebauthnDemo.java:70 test path " pubKeyCredParams: [ {type: \"public-key\", alg: -8}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -7}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -257}]\n" +
cose.algorithm
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable 1 place See details

COSE algorithm identifier

A COSE algorithm named as an identifier or as its IANA registry number - `COSEAlgorithmIdentifier.ES256`, or `alg: -7` in a WebAuthn `pubKeyCredParams`. The names match JOSE's; the numbers are the registry's.

This is the list of signature algorithms a security key or a passkey is allowed to use. Every one available today is broken by a quantum computer, so the value of writing it down now is knowing where to look later.

What to do. No post-quantum COSE algorithm is registered for WebAuthn yet. Record the exposure and keep the list short, so there is less to change when one is.

  1. src/peergos/server/tests/StandaloneWebauthnDemo.java:70 test path " pubKeyCredParams: [ {type: \"public-key\", alg: -8}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -7}, {type: \"public-key\", alg: -257}]\n" +
cose.algorithm
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS cipher suites pinned in configuration

An `ssl_ciphers`, `SSLCipherSuite` or `ssl-default-bind-ciphers` directive. Every suite available today uses a classical key exchange; a suite naming RC4, DES, 3DES, EXPORT or NULL is broken now.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls.

What to do. Remove anything below TLS 1.2. The key exchange changes when the server software offers a hybrid group, not before.

config.tls-ciphers · CWE-757
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Recorded traffic 1 place See details

TLS context created in code

`SSLContext.getInstance()`. The protocol version is reported; the key exchange it negotiates is classical in every TLS 1.2 and 1.3 cipher suite available today.

A quantum computer of sufficient size breaks this completely. It has to be replaced, not tuned. Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls.

What to do. Keep TLS 1.3, and track the hybrid key-exchange groups as they reach the JDK. TLS is where harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure is largest.

  1. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:170 SSLContext sslContext = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
java.sslcontext · CWE-757
SHA-256 Reduced margin 10 places See details

Hash algorithm through the JCA

`MessageDigest.getInstance()`. MD5 and SHA-1 are reported as already broken; SHA-256 is reported as a reduced margin rather than a defect.

A quantum computer weakens this but does not break it. Increasing the key or digest size restores the margin. Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades.

What to do. SHA-256 as the floor, SHA-384 where the digest protects something that must remain verifiable for decades.

  1. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCrypt.java:86 Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
  2. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:84 Mac mac = Mac.getInstance(algorithm);
  3. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:111 MessageDigest chunkHash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  4. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:119 chunkHash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  5. src/peergos/server/storage/RAMStorage.java:226 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  6. src/peergos/server/sync/PeergosSyncFS.java:215 MessageDigest chunkHash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  7. src/peergos/server/sync/PeergosSyncFS.java:224 chunkHash = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  8. src/peergos/server/tests/TransactionsStoreTests.java:36 test path MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
  9. src/peergos/shared/crypto/hash/Hash.java:15 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance(HASH);
  10. src/peergos/shared/crypto/hash/Hash.java:29 MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.getInstance(HASH);
java.messagedigest · CWE-328
unknown Could not be determined 4 places See details

Non-cryptographic randomness near key material

`new Random()` or `Math.random()` in a file that also imports `java.security`, `javax.crypto` or BouncyCastle. `java.util.Random` is a linear congruential generator and its output is predictable from a handful of samples. The import check is what keeps this from firing on every retry jitter and test fixture in the tree.

Part of this code uses a predictable source of random numbers. If any key comes from it, that key can be guessed today, with no quantum computer needed.

What to do. `java.security.SecureRandom`. This is a classical defect, not a quantum one, and it is worth fixing first.

  1. src/peergos/server/tests/RamUserTests.java:348 test path Random random = new Random(666);
  2. src/peergos/server/tests/RamUserTests.java:395 test path Random random = new Random(666);
  3. src/peergos/server/tests/RamUserTests.java:434 test path Random random = new Random(666);
  4. src/peergos/server/tests/RamUserTests.java:474 test path Random random = new Random(666);
java.random.insecure · CWE-338
unknown Could not be determined 1 place See details

Key store holding classical key material

`KeyStore.getInstance("JKS"|"PKCS12"|"BCFKS")`. The store format itself is not the issue; it is the inventory point where the classical private keys of this application live.

This is the application's key cupboard. It is worth knowing what is in it before planning any replacement.

What to do. Record which keys this store holds. A key store is where a migration either happens or silently does not.

  1. src/peergos/server/UserService.java:317 KeyStore ks = KeyStore.getInstance("PKCS12");
java.keystore
CSPRNG Quantum-safe 6 places See details

Random number generation

`SecureRandom`. A platform CSPRNG is not a quantum exposure; it is recorded because an inventory that omits the randomness source is incomplete. `SHA1PRNG` is named explicitly where it appears, since it is a legacy algorithm even though its output is adequate.

This is where the software gets its random numbers. Quantum computers do not weaken it.

What to do. No action. Prefer the platform default over naming an algorithm.

  1. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCryptUtil.java:45 SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG").nextBytes(salt);
  2. src/peergos/server/crypto/TweetNaCl.java:1261 return new SecureRandom();
  3. src/peergos/server/login/JdbcAccount.java:48 private final SecureRandom rnd = new SecureRandom();
  4. src/peergos/server/storage/FileBlockCache.java:30 private final SecureRandom rnd = new SecureRandom();
  5. src/peergos/server/tests/StandaloneWebauthnDemo.java:27 test path SecureRandom rnd = new SecureRandom();
  6. src/peergos/server/util/Passwords.java:10 SecureRandom rnd = new SecureRandom();
java.rng
scrypt Quantum-safe 4 places See details

Password hashing or key derivation

A `SecretKeyFactory` for PBKDF2, or a BouncyCastle password KDF. Not a quantum exposure, and part of a complete inventory.

This is how passwords are stored. Quantum computers do not meaningfully weaken it.

What to do. PBKDF2 needs a high iteration count. Argon2 through BouncyCastle is stronger.

  1. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCrypt.java:23 public class SCrypt {
  2. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCryptUtil.java:47 byte[] derived = SCrypt.scrypt(passwd.getBytes("UTF-8"), salt, N, r, p, 32);
  3. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCryptUtil.java:88 byte[] derived1 = SCrypt.scrypt(passwd.getBytes("UTF-8"), salt, N, r, p, 32);
  4. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:39 byte[] scryptHash = SCrypt.scrypt(hash, salt, memoryCost, cpuCost, parallelism, nOutputBytes);
java.kdf
HMAC Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Message authentication code through the JCA

`Mac.getInstance()`. HMAC is not broken by Shor and is only marginally affected by Grover; it is inventoried, not flagged, unless the underlying digest is broken.

This is a fingerprint used to prove a message was not altered. Quantum computers do not break it.

What to do. No action beyond avoiding HmacMD5 and HmacSHA1.

  1. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCrypt.java:86 Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
  2. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:84 Mac mac = Mac.getInstance(algorithm);
java.mac
HMAC Quantum-safe 2 places See details

Key material constructed for a named algorithm

`new SecretKeySpec(bytes, "AES")` and the other key-spec constructors name the algorithm as an argument rather than through `getInstance()`. Code that wraps raw bytes into a key this way often never calls `getInstance()` at all, so the algorithm is invisible to a scan that only looks at the factories.

This wraps raw bytes into a key for a named algorithm. It is part of the same migration as whatever uses that key.

What to do. Wherever this key is used, the same migration applies as to the call that consumes it. Trace it to the operation and treat the two together.

  1. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/lambdaworks/crypto/SCrypt.java:87 mac.init(new SecretKeySpec(passwd, "HmacSHA256"));
  2. src/peergos/server/crypto/hash/ScryptJava.java:85 SecretKey secretKey = new SecretKeySpec(secretKeyBytes, algorithm);
java.keyspec · CWE-327

Cryptographic assets

Algorithm Assessment What it means Occurrences
unknown Could not be determined The algorithm could not be established from the source - chosen at runtime, or decided somewhere this scan does not reach. 17
ECDH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 15
SHA-256 Reduced margin Pre-image resistance falls to about 128 bits of quantum work. Adequate for most uses; SHA-384 restores the full margin where a signature must last decades. 10
CSPRNG Quantum-safe A cryptographically secure random number generator provided by the platform. Not weakened by a quantum computer. 6
RSAES-PKCS1v15 Already broken PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption padding is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher oracles today, and the underlying RSA is broken by Shor. 5
HMAC Quantum-safe A keyed MAC is not affected by Shor and only marginally by Grover. 4
scrypt Quantum-safe No known quantum algorithm changes the security margin. 4
DH Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 2
TLS Quantum-vulnerable Every TLS cipher suite in general use negotiates a classical key exchange, so a recorded session is decryptable once that exchange falls. 2
MD5 Already broken Practical chosen-prefix collisions exist; MD5 has no remaining security as a digest. 1
NULL Already broken A NULL cipher provides no confidentiality at all: the session is authenticated and then sent in the clear. No quantum computer is needed to read it. 1
ECDSA Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
Ed25519 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. 1
RSASSA-PKCS1v15 Quantum-vulnerable Broken by Shor's algorithm on a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. The v1.5 signature scheme of RFC 8017 section 8.2 has no classical break of its own; RSA-PSS is preferred for new work, but the quantum exposure is the same for both. 1

Imported cryptographic libraries

Library Files
javax.crypto the JCE 11